[Last Updated: July 2006]

Towards a Resolution of the
Sri Lankan Problem

An ACSLU Report

1. The Problem Defined

Every country has its own unique problems as there is hardly any that have none. What differentiates these problems is the gravity of the issues involved. Sri Lanka too has its share of problems which as an "underdeveloped" country is greater than usual. This essay does not pretend to provide a solution for all these problems. However there is one problem which is of the utmost gravity as it touches on the very existence of the country as a unified and relatively peaceful one. This is the demand that a section of the country should be carved out as a racial homeland for the Tamils, a minority ethnic group whose numbers have been dwindling of late. This problem arose at the very inception of the country's modern history as an independent nation (in 1948), and has become aggravated in the course of the last half-century. It is to the resolution of this problem that this essay is addressed. Some associated problems which are intimately connected with this central problem will also have to be touched on. But there is no attempt to address the myriad of economic and social problems with which the country is beset, and which are aggravated by the separatist problem which will be dealt with here. In this essay we shall refer to the separatist problem in SL as "the Sri Lankan problem" but this should not be taken to mean that there are no other problems.

The responsibility for the resolution of this problem, as with all major political problems, must rest with the elected Government of Sri Lanka (or GOSL the acronym most frequently used and will also be used here). It is the contention here that the various GOSL administrations of the last two decades have aggravated rather than resolved this problem. In fact it is not even clear if the present GOSL (under President Rajapakse) has even a coherent plan to resolve this question. It has now reached a stage when great sacrifice would be needed if it is to be resolved in a way consistent with the historical record of the nation. But the consequences of not resolving it, or yeilding to those who want some kind of racial separation, which is he implication of their demand for a "Tamil homeland", will be greater in the long-term even though it might appear that some short-term benefit is reaped. The solution that is proposed in this paper looks at the long-term outcome rather than short-term gains on which most people, especially those living in Sri Lanka, seem to be interested in.

It is of course true that the solution should be advanced primarily by those residing in Sri Lanka. The solution that is proposed here is that of an expatriate Sri Lankan group the Australian Centre for Sri Lankan Unity (ACSLU). At the outset it must be acknowledged that expatriates have only a limited say in matters concerning their country of origin. The issues relating to this have been canvassed in the ACSLU paper "The Role of Expatriates in the Resolution of the Sri Lanka Problem" (www.vgweb.org/acslu/RoleExpat.htm). Whatever is said here is subject to the caveats in that Paper which identifies legitimate grounds on which expatriates can intervene in what is primarily a local problem in their erstwhile homeland.

It must also be emphasised that any solution proposed must depend on the point of time at which it is advanced. What is now considered imperative for a reasonable solution would be different from what would have been required a decade, or evern 5 years, back. If the matter is allowed to stagnate the future "soution" would be even more difficult and painful. There would also be a point of no return at which the reasonable solution that is proposed here may not be possible. Indeed there are many observers who conclude that we have alsready passed the point of no return. It is however the hope that this has not happened, and even though we may be in the eleventh hour there is still room for the correct policies to yeild the desired result.

2. Brief History of the Problem

The Sri Lankan problem has long-term, short-term and immmediate perspectives. The current situation will be commented on in the following section and in this section will give a brief comment on the longer-term and the short-term perspectives. There are two complementary forces at work. One is the decline of the dominant ethnic group in the country the Buddhist Sinhalese (who will be referred to as the "Bodhelas"). The other is the increasing militancy of the "minority groups" especially the Tamils, the Muslims and the Christian Sinhalese (Jesuhelas). The two processes have proceeded in tandem, but the decline of the Sinhalas occurred before the minority groups became strident in the pursuit of their objectives. So both aspects have to be considered.

The qualitative change in the Sinhalese occurred with the European invasion. Previous foretgn invaders came from India but cultural differences between the two were not too great. The Sinhalese were a branch of the Indo-European Aryans and while the origin of the Dravidians is still an unresolved problem their long co-existence with the Aryans in the Indian sub-continent led to a great deal of mutual burrowings. The Buddhism as it developed amongst the Sinhalese acquired many traits from the Hindu religious practice.

But it was totally different with the Portuguese invasion, the first of the Europeans to invade the country. Their twin aims were economic plunder and the spread of the Christian religion. It was the latter which did the greatest damage. The classical civilizations in Lanka, whether the classical Sinhalese or the later Hindu arrivals had a lot in common. But there was little in common with Christianity and the other Abrahamic religions. Many Sihalas, perhas awed by the technical prowess of the Portuguese and their military and economic power, we willing to betray their heritage and become the willing accomplices of the Portuguese. Initially these all embraced Christianity. The desertion from the classical Sinhala reached the highest levels. The two two greatest traitors of the period were Don Juan Dhamapala was was instrumental in betraying the low country, and Konappy Bandara who illegally sezed the throne of Kandy and began subverting the upcountry to the alien religion. But following on their example a large number of Sinhalas became accomplices of the Portuguese. These formed the vanguard of a group whom I have called the neo-Sinhalas. Today they are more conveniently designated as the Helas, a term of uncertain origin but gratly favoured by those who call themselves by that name. Gradually the Hela mindset spread to Buddhist Sinhalese as well, who even though they did not convert to Christianity absorbed some of the values of the Christian religion which they introduced into their form of Buddhism. Thus was born the Hela (or neo-Sinhala) tendency which embraced both Sinhalas who converted to Christianity and those who did not. The modern terminology to designate these sub-cultures of the Helas are Jesuhela and Bodhuhela .

The spread of the neo-Sinhala tendency was slow in the years of colonial rule. The Portuguese were succeeded by the Dutch and the British and even though they did not attack Buddhism with the same venom as the Portuguese nonetheless they sought to subvert the classical Sinhala values and encourage the new tendency of neo-Sinhala, though not to a great extent. The result was that by the end of British rule in 1948 the neo-Sinhalas were in a strong position. They secured their objective in the Great Hela Revolution of 1956 under Solomon Bandaranike who made 'Sinhala Only' his catch-cry. Solomon himself did not last long, overcome not by the Tamil separatists but by the very same Hela forces he had unleashed.

Meanwhile the Tamils were not happy at the decision of the British to grand independence to Sri Lanka as a united, democratic nation. There were two strands of Tamil agitation against the British decision, one demanding equal status with the Sinhalese (the Ponnambalam group) and the other demanding a separate independent state ("arasu kachchi") which has been mistranslated as a demand for Federalism. This group was led by Chelvanayakam. Both these groups did not advocate violent means but it was the "Federal" view that prevailed when his party changed its name to the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). The TULF approach was too tame for the militant Tamils who formed the Liberation Tamils of Tamil Eelaam (LTTE) which vowed to adopt violent and terrorist means to secure a separate state. Their first successful action against GOSL came in 1983 when they ambushed an SL army convy killing a dozen or so soldiers. Soon they set about ethnically cleansing the Jaffna peninsula of the Sinhalese.

Meanwhile the Hela political parties were engaged in a mutual struggle to share the spoils of power. The electorate began replacing one party by the other but with no progress at all. The only discordent note was struck by the Jathika Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) a terrorist grouping of Helas who followed the path of Che Guevara. While the fight against the JVP was absorbing the energies of the other Hela political groups the LTTE was allowed to gather strength, They were greatly helped by the Hela reaction to the 1983 attack which took the form of a riot against Tamils mainly in Colombo. This complemented the ethnic cleansing going on in Jaffna and thus set the stage for the next phase of the separatist problem.

The next decisive event was the action of Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian PM who made an illegal intervention in Sri Lanka to support the LTTE who were then on the brink of defeat. The capitalulation of President J. R. Jayawardene to Rajiv Gandhi by permitting the amalgamation of the Nothern and Eastern provinces as the Tamil homeland. At the time I called this "The Great Betrayal of Sri Lanka" (www.vgweb.org/grt_betr.htm) and a full analysis is contained in that publication. Needless to say the Indian intervention did nothing to dent the power of the LTTE.

All political leaders after Jayawardene such as Sirimavo Bandaranike, Premadasa, Ranil Wickremesnghe, Chandrika Kumaratunga and now Mahinda Rajapakse either did nothing or made the situation worse. They all conformed to the Hela political culture in which they looked after themselves, their kin, their friends and their Party hangers-on. A system of sleeze, patronage and corruption was set in place. Diplomatic positions were given to people as political rewards. No wonder they could not sway in international opinion which was slowly consolidating behind the Tamil separatists. Finally they could not match the LTTE propaganda machine whose story won the day. No wonder with such ineptness and corruption the LTTE was able to make headway.

3. The Current Situation

We may date the current phase as beginning with the signing of the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) with the terrorists in February 2002. By any standard this was an extraordinary agreement. There had been previous cease-fire agreements before but they did not last long and were always broken by the LTTE. The most important of these was the Premadasa's agreement under which several hundred policemen who had surrendered to the LTTE were killed in cold blood. Yet all these were forgotten and the agreement entered into this time even giving the LTTE the substance of their Eelaam demand. This took the form of one-seventh of the country which was conceded to them in which they could run their own Government.

The CFA was negotiated by the Kumaratunga-Wickremasighe government. For a time the LTTE suspended its attacks and suicide bombings, and the whole country celebrated as if a great victory had been won. They forgot that they had just sold the sovereignty of the country, and validated terrorism. It also provided the LTTE a safe and secure haven in which they could make preparations for the final Eelaam war, the fourth according to the reckoning of some. Yet the Helas turned a blind eye and enjoyed the little respite they had which was the reward for teir treachery. Meanwhile the Kumaratunga-Rajapakse GOSL which succeeded the after the electoral defeat of Kumaratunga continued the same policy with no change whatsoever. The negotiations with the LTTE conducted first in Thailand and then in Japan predictabily did not produce any tangible results.

The Tsunami of December 2004 proved to be a serback to the plans of the LTTE as it devastated the de facto Eelaam as it did other parts of Sri Lanka. The precise damage to the LTTE will never be known. Some surmised that even Prabhakaran the LTTE leader was killed in the Tsunami. But this was probably wishful thinking on the part of the Helas. The political significance of the Tsunami was that it resulted in Prime Minister Rajapakse presenting a Bill in Parliament (called after its initials PTOMS) to share foreign aid received for the Tsunami with LTTE front organisations. While this may have been rejected due to public pressure there was no restriction on NGOs operating in the LTTE territory. This was the first attempt at giving some de jure recognition to the de facto Eelaam created by the CFA.

In November 2005 the latest Presidential election was held, the two chief runners being Ranil Wickremesinge for UNP alliance and Mahinda Rajapkse for the SLFP-JVP-JHU alliance. This resulted in a narrow victory for Rajapakse with most observers agreeing that the result would have gone the other way of the LTTE had allowed Tamils in the North and East to vote freely. With the election of Rajapakse the LTTE gave up all pretense of observing the LTTE. Attacks on the security forces increased as also ethnic killings in the areas bordering the LTTE. There were targetted assasinations even in the Colombo region. The most significant of these were the killing of Foreign Minister Kadirgarmar, the suicide bombing in the Army HQ in Colombo in which the head of the Army was wounded, and the killing of the third in Command of the Army. The killing of military personnel in land and sea, and the killing of civlians reached levels not seen since the worst days of the terrorist insurgency.

In the face of these developments the President had only one policy — negotiations with the LTTE. He had forgotten that all previous attempts at negotiation with the LTTE had failed. He finally managed to arrange a negotiating session in Geneva, with the help of the Norwegian mediator. This was hailed as a great victory for the President's "peace policy". These negotiations resulted in the President to "respect and uphold" the CFA which had created the de facto Eelaam. No concession were ever got from the LTTE despite the utmost cringing servility. A subsequent negotiation session arranged for Oslo did not take place as the LTTE flatly refused even to sit with the GOSL delegation.

One would have assumed that these events would make the Rajapakse GOSL turn away from the policy of negotiation. But there is no other policy in the arsenal of the President, so he is obliged to go on with the mythical cease-fire. On July 16, 2006 a posse of over 100 SL soldiers went across the border of the de facto Eelaam at Vakenieri. They were immediately confronted by the LTTE and in the ensuing fight 12 SL soldiers were killed, one captured, and the rest beat a hasty retrueat. The bodies of killed soldiers were uncermoniously dumped into a truck, paraded aroud, surrounded by gleeful LTTE cadres. This was adding insult to injury. The bodies were subsequently handed over to GOSL. The President did not show much respect for the dead soldiers either. Their bodies were simply handed to the next-of-kin, and the blame for the whole incident was placed on the SL soldiers for daring to stray into Eelaam territory!

This is the current (July 2006) sad situation with the Rajapakse GOSL without any policy except subservience to the LTTE. Meanwhile the LTTE is receiving international recognition. It has even constructed a hospital in its de facto capital at Killinochchi with funds from the Asian Development Bank. The President's long-term solution is "maximum devolution within a unitary state". This so-called policy involves a fundamental contradiction of terms. If devolution of any sort is given the country will cease to be a unitary state. Many other groups who have put forward "solutions" speal of devolution, federalism, confederalism etc. all on a racial basis. All these solutions recognise the principle of a racial homeland for the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

Paradoxically the only group opposing the devolution plan is the LTTE. It has not compromised on its fundamental demand for a separate Eelaam. Even though it has been given the nucleus of its Eelaam demand it will continue to fight for full legal seperation. They have prubicly claimed that anything short of that will not see the end of their terrorism.

4. The Immediate Imperative (July 2006)

This leads us to suggest a solution to the impass that the country has reached in nearly 50 years of wasted opportunity since the great Hela Revolution of 1956. Because of the treachery and blunders of a succession of Hela governments there is no easy solution. The country is now in the eleventh hour. Whether this is too late one cannot say. The solution given below, which we shall describe as the ACSLU solution, is based on fundamental principles of justice and based on the historic record of Sri Lanka over the millennia and the events of last few decades.

• A1. Immediate Abrogation of the CFA.
  The CFA allows each of the two parties to terminate the agreement after two weeks notice to the Mediating Body. This proviions should be forthwith implimented.
  
  While no reasons have to be given for the termination of the Agreement the following two reasons are valid ones:
  1. The continuous violation of the Agreement by the LTTE. Even though the LTTE has not acknowledged its role in the assisinations, the armed attacks on the SL forces, the assassinations etc. this fiction should not longer be tolerated. This alone is sufficient ground as the CFA requires a parallel cessation of hostilities.
  2. All negotiations with the LTTE have failed. The purpose of the CFA was for such negotiations to be conducted while it is in force. With the farce of negotiations with the LTTE being fully exposed by the attempted negotiations in Thailand, Japan, Geneva and Oslo there is no longer any role for the CFA.
  3. The Norwegian facilitators have been totally powerless to stop the violations of the cease-fire. Moreover they can be shown to have been partial to the LTTE, actually providing them with military and logistic support.
  
  
• A2. Make the Hidden War an Open War.
  One consequence of A1 would be to force the LTTE to make good on its threat of the so-called Fourth Eelaam War. At the moment what the LTTE is doing is conducting a hidden guerilla war. With the President committed to his policy of "patience and restraint" it has little to fear for its targetted killings. The SL Army does not seem to have an advantage in guerilla war. However in a conventional war it would have the advantage.
  
  The notion that the LTTE is a superior military force is one of the myths propagated by its supporters. If we look at the real resources available it would appear that they are inferior to those at the disposal of GOSL. Its funding comes largely from the Tamil diaspora and local taxation. The former is under increasing pressure and the latter will become impossible when the Eelaam sanctuary is taken away. We know that the population of the Eelaam territory is falling and there not be enough children to recruit.
  
  
• A3. Mobilize all resources for Total War
  A regime of national austerity should be imposed to conserve funds for the war effort. A good of money is spent on sending people on diplomatic missions abroad when they achieve nothing. SL Embassadors and their bloated staff indulge themselves at Government expense. Expartriate resources rather than the diplomatic incompetents should be used to influence foreign Governments Luxury cars, expensive booze, etc. should be banned or restricted until the war is won. The racket of political stooges buying inferior weapons and pocketing the balance should be stopped. For that matter large revenues can be realised if the system of bribery and corruption is stopped. Even without imposing special taxes the above methods will yield far more than the LTTE is getting from the Tamil Diaspora.
  
  While conscription may not be necessary the nation should be prepared for that eventuality. In fact if the morale and status of the fighting forces is increased, and the casualties well taken care of, there would not be a need for conscription.
  
  
• A4. A more effective Foreign Policy
  GOSL should expect a concerted campaign from the so-called 'Inernational Community' (IC) against the military solution. It is now easier to counter this type of campaign. GOSL need only point to the Lebanon war and the war against Al Qaida to show that the military option is the preferred option of the IC in dealing with terrorism that affects them. There cannot be two standards on this matter.
  
  
• A5. Develop an Anti-Suicide Attack Strategy
  There is little doubt that the most powerful force at the disposal of the LTTE is the suicide bomber. It would already have secreted a large number of Black Tigers not only in their Eelaam territory but also in Colombo and the other cities. Sri Lanka did develop some anti-suicide policies with bag checks and raising awareness for public diligence, but this may have been lost during the past few years of the "peace process". This strategy against suicide attacks should be restarted, and the experience from other countries which has developed these to a high degree of efficiency should be tapped into. Of course allowance should be made for the occassional failure of these measures.
  
  
• A6. Blockade all LTTE-Controlled Areas
  It has been claimed a good deal of LTTE arms come through the the various ports into the country. It was the practice to facilitate the delivery of this material either through corrup officials or becuse of official intervention. Obviously this must stop. It is also claimed that the food and other necessities, and even luxuries, are allowed to reach rebel territory unimpeded. A total embargo should be placed on such movements. This should apply with even greater force to construction materials, fuel, etc. without which a military machine cannot operate. Of course it is well known that military supplies are offlo aded from chartered vessels on the high seas off Mullaitivu and other LTTE bases, and brought ashore by smaller LTTE boats. This should be stopped immediately.
  
  
• A7. The Destruction of the LTTE "Navy" and "Air force"
  The LTTE is perhaps the only terrorist group to boast that it has a functioning Navy and is constructing an Air arm as well. GOSL military sources should be capable of destroying both these. The Navy will find it difficult to hide in the open sea and will be a relatively easy target for aerial attack. The so-called air strip in LTTE territory too should be put out of action. These should be matters of high priority.
  
  
• A8. Punishment of Apprehended Terrorists and Traitors.
  It is a matter of surprise that despite that despite the killing of over 100 persons per month this year alone very few of the terrorists responsible have been arrested and none so far has been brough to trial during the entire duration of the insurgency. This is extremely curious, at the very least. Surely it is the bounden duty of the Government to punish terrorists are have been apprehended. We have the example of the US where large numbers of alleged terrorists are held at Guantanamo Bay and in secret prisons. Nothing remotely resembling this seems to exist in Sri Lanka.
  
  It is well known that large numbers of Helas are in league with, or in the pay of, the LTTE terrorists. Once again none of these traitors and informers have been arrested, and none have been charged. In a state of war it would be a serious offence to consort with the enemy. In most countries the death penalty is imposed in such cases.
  
  
• A9. Outlawing of Unethical Conversion.
  While this might not appear to be directly connected to the separatist problem it is an important reform that must proceed with the other measures foreshadowed. Unethical religious conversion is the conversion of poor people through the grant of material inducements, or through charlatanism like faith healing. This is either bribery or fraud. In many lines of activity, especially in commerce, such activities are illegal. It should also be illegal in the religious area. It must be seen that religion can also be a commercial enterprise as the devotees are expected to contribute to the religious establishment.
  
  In this connection foreign individuals and NGOs who indulge in religious conversion should be barred and their visas cancelled if they are already in the country. But unethical conversion should also apply to local religionists. In particular proper information on religion should be disseminated, and for this reason the critique of religion should be encouraged.

5. The Ultimate Goal

No amount of military action will succeed unless it is supplemented with a vision of what the nation should aim at after a successful outcome from the military strategy. The military strategy will only eliminate terrorism but the minority issues will still remain. This could be accomplished through normal political and constitutional processes. But it sould be the duty of GOSL to put forward a blueprint of how the country will look like after the defeat of terrorism.

• B1. SL should be a democratic, unitary and secular state.
  Sri Lanka already has the basic infra-structure for a democratic state in the form of a Parliament, an executive Government, an independent Judiciary, an electoral system, and a party system. The weakest element in this structure is the party system. Much of it is based on the communal system and even in other case operate like a mafia. It is the corruption in the party system which is reflected in the corruption of the executive governement and in several other areas. While reform in this area is difficult there must be a clear declaration againt it. There are several reforms that have to be made to the structures of governments, especially in the proliferation of ministries and perks given to Parlimentarians.
  
  While the British set up their newly independent colony as a unitary state this too has got eroded in the course of time. With the CFA Sri Lanka ceased to be a unitary state. Some aspects of relevance to this is considered under B2.
  
  The principle of secularism is not well known, and less well established in Sri Lanka. Perhaps no country promotes religionism to the extent that Sri Lanka does. Thus there are ministries and bureaucracies catering for every conceivable religion. This has now become a great source of conflict. The Muslims have been granted special priviliges like polygamy, government sponsored hijab, etc. on the ground that these are permitted or required in the Koran. Similar the Minister for Christian Affairs under the UNP was responsible for a great deal of anti-buddhist work. Jesuhelas are also supportive of Tamil separatism and some of them even demand their own territory to be known as the Kithunu Purawaraya. The construction of gigantic religious statues in public places by both Boduhelas and Jesuhelas has become something of a plague.
  
  
• B2. Greater Centralization, not Decentralization or Devolution.
  By international standards Sri Lanka is geographically a very small state. Most parts of it can be reached within a few hours drive. To split it into enclaves on a racial basis is a height of folly. What is needed is greater centralization so that the country's resources could be optimally used in the places that are best suited for their economic use.
  
  The current administrative division are not based on rational principles. In the first place the Provinces should be abolished and the District made the unit of administrative decentralisation. Even then the districts should be no more than local goverment units dealing with purely local matters. The argument against federalism has been stated in many places (see the present writer's "The Federal Solution to the Sri Lankan problem" at www.vgweb.org/acslu/FedrSol.htm). Devolution, even if the term Federalism is not used, needs only a slight change in the argument of that paper.
  
  
• B3. Rights of Citizens should be on the basis of Individual Rights not Group Rights.
  Citizens in a secular democracy should have rights solely on the basis that they are citizens equal in every respect to all other citizens. To give group rights on the basis that they belong to a particular race, religion, caste etc. is to introduce a dangerous principle to the grand of civic rights.
  
  Unfortunately in Sri Lanka people tend to be regarded in terms of the group to which they belong. Thus a Jesuhela is somehow treated separately from a Boduhela and special rights or previleges are extended to him. This should not be the case. Any facilities separate groups provide for themselves should be purely private facilities with no special recognition from the State.
  
  
• B4. Acceptance of the Principle of Multi-culturalism.
  Multiculturalism is an effective answer to racial or religious devolution. Under a truly multicultural regime cultural rights for separate groups would be guaranteed but no physical separation on a territorial basis takes place. Note that it is only the right to practice a cultural tradition or a religious rite that would be provided but the State would not be involved in the provision of that practice or right. This latter provision is in according awith Principle B3 considered earlier.
  
  Today more and more states are organised on the principle of multi-culturalism. This avoids the need for these countries to avoid the need to created federations or devolved areas on the basis of race, religion, etc. Many countries in the EU, Australia, Canada, the US are organised on the basis of multi-culturalism, and they have had no serious problems in this regard.
  
  It is the argument here that Sri Lanka too should adopt this principle.
  
  
• B5. Freedom of Movement, Work and Residence in any part of the Republic.
  This is a fundamental right which is necessary not only for individual rights but also for the rational use of economic resources.
  
  If Sri Lanka gives in to the principle of racial based devolution then there will be an inevitable racial separation at least in the devolved area. In the de facto Eelaam created by the CFA only Tamils will be tolerated. It will be noticed that in the early days of the ethnic conflict the Tamil extremists expelled all Sinhalese and Muslims from the Jaffna peninsula. Even today very few non-Tamils are allowed to live these areas. This will be perpetrated if federalism or even the "maximum devolution" principle of President Rajapakse is adopted.
  
  This should be a fundamental principle in whatever solution is adopted to end the the problem that SL is now facing.
  
  
• B6. Establishment of a common Charter of Rights and Obligations.
  This follows from principles B2, B3 and B4, and so little further elaboration is needed. A Charter of Basic Rights will put these rights beyond the capacity of Parliament to change except through an elaborate process which may involve a referendum with a clear majority for the change. This would provide the necessary guarantee for minorities without which they may be reluctant to accept the judgement of the majority.
  
  Claims that the rights under the Charter are violated will have to be settled by the judicial process. It is therefore essential that the Judiciary is made independent of the political or executive authority. Many countries have succeeded in establishing both principles of Basic Rights and an Independent Judiciary and it should not be beyond the capacity of Sri Lankans to do the same.
  
  
• B7. Creation of an anti-discrimination Commission.
  The main charge brought forward by the separatists in the initial phase of their campaign was that they were "discriminated". In fact even now this is the main justification for the insurgency. Several writers had exposed the hollowness of this charge. [For the present writer's refutation see "The myth of discrimination against Tamils" at www.vgweb.org/acslu/discr.htm.] However due to the non-existence of a body to official handle such charges the Tamil claim was accepted uncritically by many, especial foreigners who were not familiar with the situation in the country.
  
  The establishment of an Anti-discrimination commission will remedy this deficiency. Of course the Commission should be independent and should abide the Charger advocated in principle B6. The Commssion should also be empowered to issue binding orders to prevent the adoption of discriminatory practices where it determines that such practices exist.
  
  Several countries have such Commissions in operation, and they have worked successfully.
  
  
• B8. Universal adoption of the Tri-Lingual Policy.
  We have noted that the catch cry of the Great Hela Revolution of 1956 was "Sinhala Only". This was later qualified by "Reasonable Use of Tamil" but this change had little effect and did not dilute the strident call for Sinhala Only. The consequences of this policy soon became evident and subsequent regimes began gradally reverting to the pre-1956 practice. By the time of the Kumaratunga Presidency the old Tri-lingual Policy involving the symultaneous use of Sinhala, Tamil and English was restored.
  
  In order to avoid the kind of problems that the policy of Sinhala Only created it is propsed that the Tri-Lingual Policy be enacted as a basic principle of the State. Even though this may impose an economic burden it may not be too great a bureden given the benefit that it will create.
  
  It may be mentioned that the implementation of Sinhala Only as the educational medium created a generation of students who were cut off from access to information not in Sinhala. Because of the paucity of information in Sinhala, and the retricted availability of books even in basic subjects, and the non-availability in a whole range of subjects, this produced at least two generations of students who were ill informed. The consequences of that is clearly visible in the these generation who have now reached important position in society.

6. Consequences of Failure

The solution which we have proposed for the separatist problem in Sri Lanka in Section 4 of this essay is often called the Military Solution. This was incidentally the solution that was originally adopted when the problem erupted in the early 1980s by the then President J. R. Jayawardena. The policy came within an ace of success especially under the capable Minister of Defence Lalith Athulathmudali. However that attempt was checkmated by the intervention of Rajiv Gandhi on the side of the LTTE. The failure of the JR regime to effectively counter Rajiv Gandhi's intervention really marked the gradual abandonment of the military solution by GOSL,

Reinstating the Military Solution today is an infintely greater task than it was at the time of J.R.Jaywardene. This is because the capacity of the LTTE has greatly expanded, their international links greatly strengthened, and above all since 2002 they have been given a safe haven within the country itself. Failure to adopt the Military Solution could be considered a national failure of the greatest magnitude. Unfortunately this failure has characterised all governments since JR Jayawardena's capituation to Rajiv Gandhi. The current GOSL administration of Mahinda Rajapakse epitomises this Failure to the ultimate extent. He has described the essentials of his policy as the "Peace process" and "Negotiations" with the terrorist leader. In an oft-repeated phrase he talks of walking the "extra miles" to solve the problem in private talks with the terrorist leader. The only hitch is that the terrorist leader will not speak with him, just as he did not allow him to make the Madhu pilgrimage in 2005. Besides the President's view that a problem of this magnitude can be solved in private talks with a leading terrorist is obnoxious. Many other parties are involved in this problem. Unfortunately the "peace process" which SL governments had engaged in for the last few years has not brought peace but an endless series of killings, and negotiations have not produced anything tangible.

The catch-cry of this failed policy is "devolution". Devolution comes in many brands from the Tamil Eelaam of the LTTE to the "maximum devolution within the unitary state" of the President. But these differences of terminology mask the common fact that an area of land is to be demarcated as the Tamil homeland. The problem with this policy is that once it is granted there will be other claimants for their own share of devolved land. Thus the Muslims through the SLMC have demandeed a non-contiguous devolved area for their use. No doubt this will form the nucleus of the Sharia state. Other claimants like the plantation Tamils, the Jesuhelas etc. will not be far behind. Thus the end product of the devolutionary process will be the disintegration of Sri Lanka into a pathwork of racial or religious states.

However that will not be the final end of the devolution story. There will be disputes as to where the border of the various devolved regions should lie. Border conflict even leading to border wars could become common. Then there will be disputes as to how common resources are to be shared. This will arise in matters like the sharing of river water for irrigation, the sharing of martime resources, etc. Only a centralized state can use all the resources of the nation in a rational way for the benefit of the polity as a whole.

7. Prospects for Resolution

What are the prospects of adopting the solution outlined in sections 4 and 5 above? Frankly the prospects are indeed slim. We know that the current President has explicitly ruled out the Military solution which is at the centre of the proposed solution. Even if the question is put to a referendum it is unlikely that it will be approved. This is because of the spread of the Hela mentality amongst the ordinary people of Sri Lanka.

Paradoxcally while Sri Lanka has rejected the Military solution the world community has generally adopted it when dealing with terrorist insurgencies. Many of the succeses in putting down separatist insurgencies in many parts of the world, including our neighbour India, has been accomplished through the military solution.

The most recent development is the eruption of Islamic terrorism targeting the Western world. The Western response to this has been the military solution. It has been argued that the Western countries have large military establishments and can afford the luxury of the military solution. But then the enemy they are confronting is much more formidable that the LTTE. If Sri Lanka has to survive as the integral unit it has been for most of its history it cannot abandon the Military Solution in the present moment.

8. Conclusion

The solution proposed in the Essay consists of two parts, the immediate response (Section 4) and the Ultimate Goal (Section 5). Both parts are essential for the total solution. Of course the ultimate goal can only be implemented if the immediate actions are implemented. So what is needed is a clear statement of the shape of the ultimate goal even though its actual accomplishment willl have to await the successful outcome of the military solution.