

Apaññakasutta (Majjhima Nikāya Sutta No. 60)

1. Introduction
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Chatta Sangāyanā Edition

1. Introduction

This Sutta is one of those discourses which deal with other philosophical and religious teachings and compares the Buddha's *dhmma* to these other teachings. The pre-eminent sutta in this regard is the *Brahmajāla Sutta* which opens the Collection of Long Discourses (*Dīgha Nikāya*). That sutta dealt with some 42 philosophic-religious systems which are shown to be unsatisfactory. The present sutta deals with only a few selected views. Perhaps it was these views that interested the people of Sālā to whom the discourse was delivered.

The discourse deals with five major doctrinal views which Bhikkhu Bodhi has identified as (a) the doctrine of nihilism, (b) the doctrine of non-doing, and (c) the doctrine of non-causality (d) The doctrine of the non-existence of immaterial realms and (e) the doctrine of the cessation of being. Finally there is a classification of persons into four categories which is simply a restatement of views expressed in the Kandaraka Sutta and does not logically belong to this sutta.

The five doctrines identified above are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance a fundamental proposition of the doctrine of nihilism is the doctrine of the cessation of being. The doctrine of non-doing depends in an essential way on the doctrine of non-causality. And the doctrine of the non-existence of immaterial realms is implicit in many of the other doctrines listed. Despite this interdependence it may be useful to consider the five major doctrines listed.

The prelude to the discourse, as usual, gives the place it was delivered but not the date. The sutta begins with the Buddha asking the assembly a question rather than, as is more usual, the other way around. The question is whether the people have found a "pleasing teacher" (*manāpo satthā*) towards whom they "have confidence based on reason" (*ākāravatī saddhā paṭiladdhā*). Both Bhikkhu Bodhi and Horner speak of having "faith" in the teacher, but this gives a wrong twist to the question. On receiving a negative answer the Buddha asks the people to adopt the Dhamma as their guide, calling it *apaññako*, a term translated as "incontrovertible" (Bodhi), or "sure" (Horner) but is better rendered as "certain" or "correct".

All the doctrines considered in this sutta cannot be commented on in this short introduction so only a few salient point are mentioned with reference to each of them.

(a) The Doctrine of Nihilism

What is called nihilism may be identified with the modern doctrine of extreme materialism. This view considers only material things which could be comprehended empirically as real, and considers all moral considerations a being completely arbitrary and lacking an intrinsic validity.. Aspects similar to this is contained in modern doctrines like atheism, Humanism, logical positivism, Marxism etc. but it cannot be equated completely with any of these.

This doctrine is described as (a) denying the efficacy of giving, offering and sacrifice, (b) a denial of the law of action and result (*kamma-vipāka*) (c) denial of this world and other worlds (d) denial of service to one's own parents; (e) denial of *devas* and (f) denial of philosophers who have a self-realised theory of the world (universe). The true doctrine would state the opposite. Since the Dhamma is this opposite we may consider whether the opposite of (a) to (f) could reasonably be accepted as correct.

It may be reasonable to accept the opposite of (a) provided that sacrifice is not interpreted as sacrificing animals but in sacrificing oneself in appropriate circumstances. The opposite of (b) again could be accepted rationally provided that the fruit of an action may be realised in this world itself. The opposite of (c) too may be acceptable provided by "other worlds" is meant the existence of extra-terrestrial life and not some mythical world of heaven or hell. The opposite of (d) may be acceptable provided we mean that support of parents is a good thing. The opposite of (e), viz. that *devas* (gods) exist may not be rationally acceptable unless one gives a special metaphorical meaning to "gods". The opposite of (f) may also be rationally acceptable as we cannot assert that no philosopher has promulgated a correct view of the universe by his own unaided efforts.

(b) The Doctrine of Non-Doing

This doctrine is an elaboration of one of the aspects of the nihilist position, viz. the denial of the doctrine of action and its fruits. What the doctrine of non-doing means is that no evil consequences result from evil acts. This is essentially a denial of the law of kamma.

The Buddha's point is that people who hold on to the view of non-doing would be led to commit "bodily misconduct, verbal misconduct, and mental misconduct". This argument relies on the supposed moral consequences of the doctrine of non-doing, and does not in itself constitute a logical refutation of this view. What this indicates is that in the evaluation of a doctrinal position the moral consequences of the view override other consequences.

(c) The Doctrine of Non-Causality

This asserts a cardinal principle of dhamma, viz. that all things arise out of a cause and have definite consequences. This is a basic scientific principle and science seeks to elucidate the causes of things. However the particular case of causality that is mentioned is the case of the "defilement" or non-defilement of individuals. The doctrine of non-causality is attributed to Makkhali Gosāla who believed that the destiny of individuals is determined by chance factors rather than explicit causes.

In the modern religious debate certain religious beliefs like that of creation would violate this law. Even if it is asserted that "God" is the cause of creation there is no explanation of what causes God. This view thus violates the law of causality as *all* things arise from an antecedent cause.

In the Buddha's view the "cause" of a person's status, especially at birth, is determined by his karmic inheritance, which could be identified as the cause. As the doctrine of dependent origination states the causes are cyclic and an regress to an infinite extent.

(d) The Doctrine of the Non-Existence of Immaterial Realms

The immaterial realms mentioned here appear to relate to the four immaterial jhanas. The Buddha's position is that the meditator can reach these immaterial realms and therefore they be considered to exist for such a person. On the other hand some meditators may not be able to reach the immaterial planes and they would subscribe to the doctrine of the non-existence of immaterial planes.

However an ability to reach the immaterial planes, and therefore believe in their existence, is not considered an absolutely essential condition for spiritual progress.

(e) the Doctrine of the Cessation of Being

This is a very short passage and develops on one other aspect ascribed to the nihilist view that there is no rebirth. The doctrine of "no cessation" is taken to mean that a person can be reborn according to his karmic destiny. This view is acceptable according to the Buddha, but there is very little explanation of justification of this proposition. Thus any of the interpretations that are usually given to the notion of rebirth may be read into this brief section.

The Buddha's main argument of the view of the total annihilation of being at death is that this view leads people "close to lust, close to bondage, close to delighting, close to holding, close to clinging" while the opposite leads to non-lust, non-bondage, non-delighting, non-holding, and non-clinging. This supports the view maintained by those who give a rational interpretation of Buddhism that the Buddha's doctrine of rebirth is not a statement of fact but a device to lead people to follow a moral life and one in conformity with Buddhist views.

Conclusion

While superficially this sutta seems to be a refutation of the nihilist position it is actually against some moral position which nihilists might draw from their world view. However it is possible that nihilists could reconcile their position their ideological position with a morality and action which could coincide with that recommended by the Buddha in his eight-fold path.

2. The Incontrovertible Teaching

Translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi

1. THUS HAVE I HEARD. On one occasion the Blessed One was wandering in the Kosalan country with a large Sangha of bhikkhus, and eventually he arrived at a Kosalan brahmin village named Sālā.

2. The brahmin householders of Sālā heard: "The recluse Gotama, the son of the Sakyans who went forth from a Sakyan clan, has been wandering in the Kosalan country with a large Sangha of bhikkhus and has come to Sālā. Now a good report of Master Gotama has been spread to this effect: 'That Blessed One is accomplished, fully enlightened, perfect in true knowledge and conduct, sublime, knower of worlds, incomparable leader of persons to be tamed, teacher of gods and humans, enlightened, blessed. He declares this world with its gods, its Māras, and its Brahmās, this generation

with its recluses and brahmins, its princes and its people, which he has himself realised with direct knowledge. He teaches the Dhamma good the beginning, good in the middle, and good in the end, with the right meaning and phrasing, and he reveals a holy life that utterly perfect and pure.’ Now it is good to see such arahants.”

3. Then the brahmin householders of Sālā went to the Blessed One. Some paid homage to the Blessed One and sat down at one side; some exchanged greetings with him, and when this courteous and amiable talk was finished, sat down at one side; some extended their hands in reverential salutation towards the Blessed One and sat down at one side; some pronounced the name and clan in the Blessed One’s presence and sat down at one side; some kept silent and sat down at one side.

4. When they were seated, the Blessed One asked: "Householders, is there any teacher agreeable to you in whom you have acquired faith supported by reasons?"¹

“No, venerable sir, there is no teacher agreeable to us in whom we have acquired faith supported by reasons.”

“Since, householders, you have not found an agreeable teacher, you may undertake and practise this incontrovertible teaching;² for when the incontrovertible teaching is accepted and undertaken, it will lead to your welfare and happiness for a long time. And what is the incontrovertible teaching ?³

(I. THE DOCTRINE OF NIHILISM)

5. (A) “Householders, there are some recluses and brahmins whose doctrine and view is this: ‘There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed; no fruit or result of good and bad actions; no this world, no other world; no mother, no father; no beings who are reborn spontaneously; no good and virtuous recluses and brahmins in the world who have themselves realised by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world.’⁴

6. (B) “Now there are some recluses and brahmins whose doctrine is directly opposed to that of those recluses and brahmins. And they say thus: ‘There is what is given and what is offered, what is sacrificed; there is fruit and result of good and bad actions; there is this world and the other world; there is mother; there is father; there are beings who are reborn spontaneously; there are good and virtuous recluses and brahmins in the world who have themselves realised by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world.’ What do you think, householders? Don’t these recluses and brahmins hold doctrines directly opposed to each other?” –“Yes, venerable sir.”

7. (A.i) “Now, householders, of those recluses and brahmins whose doctrine and view is this: ‘There is nothing given ... no good and virtuous recluses and brahmins in the world who have themselves realised by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world,’ it is to be expected that they will deny these three wholesome states, namely, good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, and good mental conduct, and that they will undertake and practise these three unwholesome states, namely, bodily misconduct, verbal misconduct, and mental misconduct. Why is that? Because those good recluses and brahmins do not see in unwholesome states the danger, degradation, and defilement, nor do they see in wholesome states the blessing of renunciation, the aspect of cleansing.

8. (A.ii) “Since there actually is another world, one who holds the view ‘there is no other world’ has wrong view. Since there actually is another world, one who intends ‘there is no other world’ has wrong intention. Since there actually is another world, one who makes the statement ‘there is no other world’ has wrong speech. Since there actually is another world, one who says ‘there is no other world’ is opposed to those arahants who know the other world. Since there actually

1. MA: The Buddha began by asking this question because the village of Sālā was situated at the entrance to a forest, and many recluses and brahmins of diverse creeds would stay there overnight, expounding their own views and tearing down the views of their opponents. This left the villagers perplexed, unable to commit themselves to particular teaching.

2. *Apaṇṇakadhamma*. MA explains this as a teaching that is uncontradictable, free from ambiguity, definitely acceptable (*aviraddho advejjhagamT ekarfisagahiko*). The term also occurs at AN 3:16/L113 and AN 4:71/ii.76

3. The three views discussed in §§5, 13 and 21 are called wrong views with fixed evil result (*niyata miccha ditṭhiti*). To adhere to them with firm conviction closes off the prospect of a heavenly rebirth and the attainment of liberation. For a fuller discussion see Bodhi, *Discourse on the Fruits of Reclusheship*, pp. 79-83. The examination of these views unfolds according to the following pattern: The Buddha discloses the wrong view A and its antithesis B. Taking up A for examination first, in A.i he shows the pernicious effect of this view on bodily, verbal, and mental conduct. In A.ii he elicits additional negative consequences of its adoption. Then in A.iii he shows how a wise person comes to the conclusion that whether or not the view is true, it serves his best interest to reject it. Next, position B is considered. In B.i the Buddha describes the wholesome influence of this view on conduct. In B.ii he elicits additional positive consequences of adopting such a view. And in B.iii he shows how a wise person comes to the conclusion that, irrespective of its actual veracity, it serves his best interest to conduct his affairs as though the view is true.

4. See n.425 for clarification of several expressions used in the formulation of this view.

is another world, one who convinces another ‘there is no other world’ convinces him to accept an untrue Dhamma; and because he convinces another to accept an untrue Dhamma, he praises himself and disparages others. Thus any pure virtue that he formerly had is abandoned and corrupt conduct is substituted.⁵ And this wrong view, wrong intention, wrong speech, opposition to noble ones, convincing another to accept an untrue Dhamma, and self-praise and disparagement of others - these several evil unwholesome states thus come into being with wrong view as their condition.

9. (A.iii) “About this a wise man considers thus: ‘If there is no other world, then on the dissolution of the body this good person will have made himself safe enough⁶. But if there is another world, then on the dissolution of the body, after death, he will reappear in a state of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, even in hell. Now whether or not the word of those good recluses and brahmins is true, let me assume that there is no other world: still this good person is here and now censured by the wise as an immoral person, one of wrong view who holds the doctrine of nihilism.⁷ But on the other hand, if there is another world, then this good person has made an unlucky throw on both counts: since he is censured by the wise here and now, and since on the dissolution of the body, after death, he will reappear in a state of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, ‘m perdition, even in hell. He has wrongly accepted and undertaken this incontrovertible teaching in such a way that it extends only to one side and excludes the wholesome alternative. 1621

10. (B.i) “Now, householders, of those recluses and brahmins whose doctrine and view is this: ‘There is what is given ... there are good and virtuous recluses and brahmins in the world who have themselves realised by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world,’ it is to be expected that they will avoid these three unwholesome states, namely, bodily misconduct, verbal misconduct, and mental misconduct, and that they will undertake and practise these three wholesome states, namely, good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, and good mental conduct. Why is that? Because those good recluses and brahmins see in unwholesome states the danger, degradation, and defilement, and they see in wholesome states the blessing of renunciation, the aspect of cleansing.

11. (B.ii) “Since there actually is another world, one who holds the view ‘there is another world’ has right view. Since there actually is another world, one who intends ‘there is another world’ has right intention. Since there actually is another world, one who makes the statement ‘there is another world’ has right speech. Since there actually is another world, one who says ‘there is another world’ is not opposed to those arahants who know the other world. Since there actually is another world, one who convinces another ‘there is another world’ convinces him to accept true Dhamma; and because he convinces another to accept true Dhamma, he does not praise himself and disparage others. Thus any corrupt conduct that he formerly had is abandoned and pure virtue is substituted. And this right view, right intention, right speech, non-opposition to noble ones, convincing another to accept true Dhamma, and avoidance of self-praise and disparagement of others - these several wholesome states thus come into being with right view as their condition.⁸

12. (B.iii) “About this a wise man considers thus: ‘If there is another world, then on the dissolution of the body, after death, this good person will reappear in a happy destination, even in the heavenly world. Now whether or not the word of those good recluses and brahmins is true, let me assume that there is no other world: still this good person is here and now praised by the wise as a virtuous person, one with right view who holds the doctrine of affirmation.⁹ And on the other hand, if there is another world, then this good person has made a lucky throw on both counts: since he is praised by the wise here and now, and since on the dissolution of the body, after death, he will reappear in a happy destination, even in the heavenly world. He has rightly accepted and undertaken this incontrovertible teaching in such a way that it extends to both sides and excludes the unwholesome alternative.¹⁰

(II. THE DOCTRINE OF NON-DOING)¹¹

5. The Pali terms are *susīla* and *dusīla*. Since “corrupt virtue” sounds self-contradictory, “conduct” has been used in my rendering of the latter expression. Rm had used “unvirtuousness.”

6. He has made himself safe (*sotthi*) in the sense that he will not be subject to suffering in a future existence. However, he is still liable to the types of suffering to be encountered in this existence, which the Buddha is about to mention.

7. *Natthikavada*, lit. “the doctrine of non-existence,” is so called because it denies the existence of an afterlife and of kammic retribution.

8. His undertaking of the incontrovertible teaching “extends only to one side” in the sense that he makes himself safe with regard to the next life only on the presupposition that there is no afterlife, while if there is an afterlife he loses on both counts.

9. *Atthikavada*: the affirmation of the existence of an afterlife and of kammic retribution.

10. His undertaking “extends to both sides” since he reaps the benefits of his view affirming the afterlife whether or not an afterlife actually exists.

11. This doctrine of non-doing (*akiriyavada*), in the *Samaññaphala Sutta* (DN 2.17/L52-53), is attributed to Purana Kassapa. Although on first encounter the view seems to rest on materialist premises, as the previous nihilistic view does, there is canonical evidence that Purana Kassapa subscribed to a fatalistic doctrine. Thus his moral

13. (A) “Householders, there are some recluses and brahmins, whose doctrine and view is this: ‘When one acts or makes others act, when one mutilates or makes others mutilate, when one tortures or makes others inflict torture, when one inflicts sorrow or makes others inflict sorrow, when one oppresses or makes others inflict oppression, when one intimidates or makes others inflict intimidation, when one kills living beings, takes what is not given, breaks into houses, plunders wealth, commits burglary, ambushes highways, seduces another’s wife, utters falsehood - no evil is done by the doer. If, with a razor-rimmed wheel, one were to make the living beings on this earth into one mass of flesh. into one heap of flesh, because of this there would be no evil and no outcome of evil. If one were to go along the south bank of the Ganges killing and slaughtering, mutilating and making others mutilate, torturing and making others inflict torture, because of this there would be no evil and no outcome of evil. If one were to go along the north bank of the Ganges giving gifts and making others give gifts, making offerings and making others make offerings, because of this there would be no merit and no outcome of merit. By giving, by taming oneself, by restraint, by speaking truth, there is no merit and no outcome of merit.’

14. (B) “Now there are some recluses and brahmins whose doctrine is directly opposed to that of those recluses and brahmins, and they say thus: ‘When one acts or makes others act, when one mutilates or makes others mutilate ... utters falsehood - evil is done by the doer. If, with a razor-rimmed wheel, one were to make the living beings on this earth into one mass of flesh, into one heap of flesh, because of this there would be evil and the outcome of evil. If one were to go along the south bank of the Ganges killing and slaughtering, mutilating and making others mutilate, torturing and making others inflict torture, because of this there would be evil and the outcome of evil. If one were to go along the north bank of the Ganges giving gifts and making others give gifts, making offerings and making others make offerings, because of this there would be merit and the outcome of merit. By giving, by taming oneself, by restraint, by speaking truth, there is merit and the outcome of merit.’ What do you think, householders? Don’t these recluses and brahmins hold doctrines directly opposed to each other?” “Yes, venerable sir.”

15. (A.i) “Now, householders, of those recluses and brahmins whose doctrine and view is this: ‘When one acts or makes others act ... there is no merit and no outcome of merit,’ it is to be expected that they will avoid these three wholesome states, namely, good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct and good mental conduct, and that they will undertake and practise these three unwholesome states, namely, bodily misconduct, verbal misconduct, and mental misconduct. Why is that? Because those good recluses and brahmins do not see in unwholesome states the danger, degradation, and defilement, nor do they see in wholesome states the blessing of renunciation, the aspect of cleansing.

16. (A.ii) “Since there actually is doing, one who holds the view ‘there is no doing’ has wrong view. Since there actually is doing, one who intends ‘there is no doing’ has wrong intention. Since there actually is doing, one who makes the statement ‘there is no doing’ has wrong speech. Since there actually is doing, one who says ‘there is no doing’ is opposed to those arahants who hold the doctrine that there is doing. Since there actually is doing, one who convinces another ‘there is no doing’ convinces him to accept an untrue Dhamma; and because he convinces another to accept an untrue Dhamma, he praises himself and disparages others. Thus any pure virtue that he formerly had is abandoned and corrupt conduct is substituted. And this wrong view, wrong intention, wrong speech, opposition to noble ones, convincing another to accept an untrue Dhamma, and self-praise and disparagement of others these several evil unwholesome states thus come into being with wrong view as their condition.

17. (A.iii) “About this a wise man considers thus: ‘If there is no doing, then on the dissolution of the body this good person will have made himself safe enough. But if there is doing, then on the dissolution of the body, after death, he will reappear in a state of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, even in hell. Now whether or not the word of those good recluses and brahmins is true, let me assume that there is no doing: still this good person is here and now censured by the wise as an immoral person, one of wrong view who holds the doctrine of non-doing. But on the other hand, if there is doing, then this good person has made an unlucky throw on both counts: since he is censured by the wise here and now, and since on the dissolution of the body, after death, he will reappear in a state of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, even in hell. He has wrongly accepted and undertaken this incontrovertible teaching in such a way that it extends only to one side and excludes the wholesome alternative.’

18. (B.i) “Now, householders, of those recluses and brahmins whose doctrine and view is this: ‘When one acts or makes others act ... there is merit and outcome of merit,’ it is to be expected that they will avoid these three unwholesome states, namely, bodily misconduct, verbal misconduct, and mental misconduct, and that they will undertake and practise these three wholesome states, namely, good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, and good mental conduct. Why is that? Because those good recluses and brahmins see in unwholesome states the danger, degradation, and defilement, and they see in wholesome states the blessing of renunciation, the aspect of cleansing.

19. (B.ii) “Since there actually is doing, one who holds the view ‘there is doing’ has right view. Since there actually is doing, one who intends ‘there is doing’ has right intention. Since there actually is doing, one who makes the

statement ‘there is doing’ has right speech. Since there actually is doing, one who says ‘there is doing’ is not opposed to those arahants who hold the doctrine that there is doing. Since there actually is doing, one who convinces another ‘there is doing’ convinces him to accept true Dhamma; and because he convinces another to accept true Dhamma, he does not praise himself and disparage others. Thus any corrupt conduct that he formerly had is abandoned and pure virtue is substituted. And this right view, right intention, right speech, non-opposition to noble ones, convincing another to accept true Dhamma, and avoidance of self-praise and disparagement of others - these several wholesome states thus come into being with right view as their condition.

20. (B.iii) “About this a wise man considers thus: ‘If there is doing, then on the dissolution of the body, after death, this good person will reappear in a happy destination, even in the heavenly world. Now whether or not the word of those good recluses and brahmins is true, let me assume that there is no doing: still this good person is here and now praised by the wise as a virtuous person, one with right view who holds the doctrine of doing. And on the other hand, if there is doing, then this good person has made a lucky throw on both counts: since he is praised by the wise here and now, and since on the dissolution of the body, after death, he will reappear in a happy destination, even in the heavenly world. He has rightly accepted and undertaken this incontrovertible teaching in such a way that it extends to both sides and excludes the unwholesome alternative.’

(III. THE DOCTRINE OF NON-CAUSALITY)¹²

21. (A) “Householders, there are some recluses and brahmins whose doctrine and view is this: ‘There is no cause or condition for the defilement of beings; beings are defiled without cause or condition. There is no cause or condition for the purification of beings; beings are purified without cause or condition. There is no power, no energy, no manly strength, no manly endurance. All beings, all living things, all creatures, all souls are without mastery, power, and energy; moulded by destiny, circumstance, and nature, they experience pleasure and pain in the six classes.’¹³

22. (B) “Now there are some recluses and brahmins whose doctrine is directly opposed to that of those recluses and brahmins, and they say thus: ‘There is a cause and condition for the defilement of beings; beings are defiled owing to a cause and condition. There is a cause and condition for the purification of beings; beings are purified owing to a cause and condition. [here is power, energy, manly strength, manly endurance. It is not the case that all beings, all living things, all creatures, all souls are without mastery, power, and energy, or that moulded by destiny, circumstance, and nature, they experience pleasure and pain in the six classes.’ What do you think, householders? Don’t these recluses and brahmins hold doctrines directly opposed to each other?” - “Yes, venerable sir.”

23. (A.i) “Now, householders, of those recluses and brahmins whose doctrine and view is this: ‘There is no cause or condition for the defilement of beings ... they experience pleasure and pain in the six classes,’ it is to be expected that they will avoid these three wholesome states, namely, good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, and good mental conduct, and that they will undertake and practise these three unwholesome states, namely, bodily misconduct, verbal misconduct, and mental misconduct. Why is that? Because those good recluses and brahmins do not see in unwholesome states the danger, degradation, and defilement, nor do they see in wholesome states the blessing of renunciation, the aspect of cleansing.

24. (A.ii) “Since there actually is causality, one who holds the view ‘there is no causality’ has wrong view. Since there actually is causality, one who intends ‘there is no causality’ has wrong intention. Since there actually is causality, one who makes the statement ‘there is no causality’ has wrong speech. Since there actually is causality, one who says ‘there is no causality’ is opposed to those arahants who hold the doctrine of causality. Since there actually is causality, one who convinces another ‘there is no causality’ convinces him to accept an untrue Dhamma; and because he convinces another to accept an untrue Dhamma, he praises himself and disparages others. Thus any pure virtue that he formerly had is abandoned and corrupt conduct is substituted. And this wrong view, wrong intention, wrong speech, opposition to noble ones, convincing another to accept an untrue Dhamma, and self-praise and disparagement of others - these several evil unwholesome states thus come into being with wrong view as their condition.

25. (A.iii) “About this a wise man considers thus: ‘If there is no causality, then on the dissolution of the body this good person will have made himself safe enough. But if there is causality, then on the dissolution of the body, after death,

12. This is the doctrine of non-causality (*ahetukavada*) maintained by the Ajīvaka leader Makkhali Gosala, and called in the *Samaññaphala Sutta* the doctrine of purification by saṃsāra (*saṃsārasuddhi*, DN 2.21 / L54). The philosophy of Makkhali Gosala has been examined in detail by Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ajīvikas*, Chapters 12 and 13. A translation of the D-igha commentary on this doctrine will be found in Bodhi, *Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship*, pp. 70-77.

13. *Niyati*, destiny or fate, is the primary explanatory principle in Makkhali’s philosophy, “circumstance and nature” (*sangatibhava*) seem to be its modes of operation in external events and in the constitution of the individual, respectively. The six classes (*abhijati*) are six gradations of human beings according to their level of spiritual development, the highest being reserved for the three mentors of the Ajīvakas mentioned at MN 36.5. On the six classes, see Bodhi, *Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship*, pp. 73-75. Also, AN 6:57/iii.383-84.

he will reappear in a state of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, even in hell. Now whether or not the word of those good recluses and brahmins is true, let me assume that there is no causality: still this good person is here and now censured by the wise as an immoral person, one of wrong view who holds the doctrine of non-causality. But on the other hand, if there is causality, then this good person has made an unlucky throw on both counts: since he is censured by the wise here and now, and since on the dissolution of the body, after death, he will reappear in a state of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, even in hell. He has wrongly accepted and undertaken this incontrovertible teaching in such a way that it extends only to one side and excludes the wholesome alternative.'

26. (B.i) "Now, householders, of those recluses and brahmins whose doctrine and view is this: 'There is a cause and condition for the defilement of beings ... they experience pleasure and pain in the six classes,' it is to be expected that they will avoid these three unwholesome states, namely, bodily misconduct, verbal misconduct, and mental misconduct, and that they will undertake and practise these three wholesome states, namely, good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, and good mental conduct. Why is that? Because those good recluses and brahmins see in unwholesome states the danger, degradation, and defilement, and they see in wholesome states the blessing of renunciation, the aspect of cleansing.

27. (B.ii) "Since there actually is causality, one who holds the view 'there is causality' has right view. Since there actually is causality, one who intends 'there is causality' has right intention. Since there actually is causality, one who makes the statement 'there is causality' has right speech. Since there actually is causality, one who says 'there is causality' is not opposed to those arahants who hold the doctrine of causality. Since there actually is causality, one who convinces another 'there is causality' convinces him to accept true Dhamma; and because he convinces another to accept true Dhamma, he does not praise himself and disparage others. Thus any corrupt conduct that he formerly had is abandoned and pure virtue is substituted. And his right view, right intention, right speech, non-opposition to noble ones, convincing another to accept true Dhamma, and avoidance of self-praise and disparagement of others - these several wholesome states thus come into being with right view as their condition.

28. (B.iii) "About this a wise man considers thus: 'If there is causality, then on the dissolution of the body, after death, this good person will reappear in a happy destination, even in the heavenly world. Now whether or not the word of those good recluses and brahmins is true, let me assume that there is no causality: still this good person is here and now praised by the wise as a virtuous person, one with right view who holds the doctrine of causality. And on the other hand, if there is [4101] causality, then this good person has made a lucky throw on both counts: since he is praised by the wise here and now, and since on the dissolution of the body, after death, he will reappear in a happy destination, even in the heavenly world. He has rightly accepted and undertaken this incontrovertible teaching in such a way that it extends to both sides and excludes the unwholesome alternative.'

(IV. THERE ARE NO IMMATERIAL REALMS)

29. "Householders, there are some recluses and brahmins whose doctrine and view is this: 'There are definitely no immaterial realms.'¹⁴

30. "Now there are some recluses and brahmins whose doctrine is directly opposed to that of those recluses and brahmins, and they say thus: 'There definitely are immaterial realms.' What do you think, householders? Don't these recluses and brahmins hold doctrines directly opposed to each other?" "Yes, venerable sir."

31. "About this a wise man considers thus: 'These good recluses and brahmins hold the doctrine and view "there are definitely no immaterial realms," but that has not been seen by me. And these other good recluses and brahmins hold the doctrine and view "there definitely are immaterial realms," but that has not been known by me. If, without knowing and seeing, I were to take one side and declare: "Only this is true, anything else is wrong," that would not be fitting for me. Now as to the recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and view "there definitely are no immaterial realms," if their word is true then it is certainly still possible that I might reappear [after death] among the gods of the fine-material realms who consist of mind.'¹⁵ But as to the recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and view "there definitely are immaterial realms," if their word is true then it is certainly possible that I might reappear [after death] among the gods of the immaterial realms who consist of perception. The taking up of rods and weapons, quarrels, brawls, disputes, recrimination, malice, and false speech are seen to occur based' on material form, but this does not exist at all in the immaterial realms.' After reflecting thus, he practises the way to dispassion towards material forms, to the fading away and cessation of material forms.'¹⁶

14. This is a denial of the four immaterial planes of existence, the objective counterparts of the four immaterial meditative attainments.

15. These are the gods of the planes corresponding to the four jhanas. They possess bodies of subtle matter, unlike the gods of the immaterial planes who consist entirely of mind without any admixture of matter.

16. MA: Even though the wise man discussed here has doubts about the existence of the immaterial planes, he attains the fourth jhana, and on the basis of that he attempts to attain the immaterial absorptions. If he fails he is certain of

(V. THERE IS NO CESSATION OF BEING)

32. “Householders, there are some recluses and brahmins whose doctrine and view is this: ‘There is definitely no cessation of being.’¹⁷

33. “Now there are some recluses and brahmins whose doctrine is directly opposed to that of those recluses and brahmins, and they say thus: ‘There definitely is a cessation of being.’ What do you think, householders? Don’t these recluses and brahmins hold doctrines directly opposed to each other?” “Yes, venerable sir.”

34. “About this a wise man considers thus: ‘These good recluses and brahmins hold the doctrine and view “there is definitely no cessation of being,” but that has not been seen by me. And these other good recluses and brahmins hold the doctrine and view “there definitely is a cessation of being,” but that has not been known by me. If, without knowing and seeing, I were to take one side and declare: “Only this is true, anything else is wrong,” that would not be fitting for me. Now as to the recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and view “there definitely is no cessation of being,” if their word is true then it is certainly still possible that I might reappear [after death] among the gods of the immaterial realms who consist of perception. But as to the recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and view “there definitely is a cessation of being,” if their word is true then it is possible that I might here and now attain final Nibbana. The view of those good recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and view “there definitely is no cessation of being” is close to lust, close to bondage, close to delighting, close to holding, close to clinging; but the view of those good recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and view “there definitely is cessation of being” is close to non-lust, close to non-bondage, close to non-delighting, close to non-holding, close to non-clinging. After reflecting thus, he practises the way to dispassion towards being, to the fading away and cessation of being.’¹⁸

(FOUR KINDS OF PERSONS)

35. “Householders, there are four kinds of persons to be found existing in the world. What four? Here a certain kind of person torments himself and pursues the practice of torturing himself. Here a certain kind of person torments others and pursues the practice of torturing others. Here a certain kind of person torments himself and pursues the practice of torturing himself, and he also torments others and pursues the practice of torturing others. Here a certain kind of person does not torment himself or pursue the practice of torturing himself, and he does not torment others or pursue the practice of torturing others. Since he torments neither himself nor others, he is here and now hungerless, extinguished, and cooled, and he abides experiencing bliss, having himself become holy.

36. “What kind of person, householders, torments himself and pursues the practice of torturing himself? Here a certain person goes naked, rejecting conventions... (*as Sutta 51, §8*) ... Thus in such a variety of ways he dwells pursuing the practice of tormenting and mortifying the body. This is called the kind of person who torments himself and pursues the practice of torturing himself.

37. “What kind of person, householders, torments others and pursues the practice of torturing others? Here a certain person is a butcher of sheep ... (*as Sutta 51, §9*) ... or one who follows any other such bloody occupation. This is called the kind of person who torments others and pursues the practice of torturing others.

38. “What kind of a person, householders, torments himself and pursues the practice of torturing himself and also torments others and pursues the practice of torturing others? Here some person is a head-anointed noble king or a well-to-do brahmin... (*as Sutta 51, §10*) ... And then his slaves, messengers, and servants make preparations, weeping with tearful faces, being spurred on by threats of punishment and by fear. This is called the kind of person who torments himself and pursues the practice of torturing himself and who torments others and pursues the practice of torturing others.

39. “What kind of person, householders, does not torment himself or pursue the practice of torturing himself and does not torment others or pursue the practice of torturing others - the one who, since he torments neither himself nor others, is here and now hungerless, extinguished, and cooled, and abides experiencing bliss, having himself become holy?

40-55. “Here, householders, a Tathagata appears in the world ... (*as Sutta 51, §§12-27*) [4131 ... He understands: ‘Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming to any state of being.’

56. “This, householders, is called the kind of person who does not torment himself or pursue the practice of torturing himself and who does not torment others or pursue the practice of torturing others - the one who, since he torments neither himself nor others, is here and now hungerless, extinguished, and cooled, and abides experiencing bliss,

rebirth in the fine-material planes, but if he succeeds he will be reborn in the immaterial planes. Thus for him this wager is an “incontrovertible teaching.”

17. MA: Cessation of being (*bhavanirodha*) here is **Nibbana**.

18. MA: Even though this person has doubts about the existence of Nibbana, he attains the eight attainments, and then, using one of those attainments as a basis, he develops insight, thinking: “If there is cessation, then I will reach arahantship and attain Nibbana.” If he fails he is certain of rebirth in the immaterial planes, but if he succeeds he reaches arahantship and attains Nibbana.

having himself become holy.”

57. When this was said, the brahmin householders of Sālā said to the Blessed One: “Magnificent, Master Gotama! Magnificent, Master Gotama! Master Gotama has made the Dhamma clear in many ways, as though he were turning upright what had been overthrown, revealing what was hidden, showing the way to one who was lost, or holding up a lamp in the darkness for those with eyesight to see forms. We go to Master Gotama for refuge and to the Dhamma and to the Sangha of bhikkhus. From today let Master Gotama accept us as lay followers who have gone to him for refuge for life.”

3. Discourse on the Sure Translated by I. B. Horner (PTS)

Thus have I heard: At one time the Lord, walking on tour among the Kosalans together with a large Order of monks, arrived at the brahman village of the Kosalans named Sālā. The brahman householders of Sālā, heard: “It is said that the recluse Gotama, the son of the Sakyans, gone forth from the Sakyan family, and walking on tour among the Kosalans together with a large Order of monks, has reached Sālā, and that a lovely reputation has gone forth about the Lord Gotama thus: ‘The Lord is perfected, wholly Self-awakened, endowed with (right) knowledge and conduct, well-farer, knower of the worlds, incomparable charioteer of men to be tamed, teacher of *devas* and men, the Awakened One, the Lord. He makes known this world with the *devas*, with Māra, with Brahmā, creation with its recluses and brahmans, its *devas* and men, having realised them by his own super-knowledge. He teaches *dhamma* that is lovely at the beginning, lovely in the middle, lovely at the ending, with the spirit and the letter; he proclaims the Brahma-faring wholly fulfilled, quite purified. It were good to see perfected ones like this.’”

Then the brahman householders of Sālā approached the Lord; some, having approached, having greeted the Lord, sat down at a respectful distance; some exchanged greetings with the Lord and having conversed in a friendly and courteous way, sat down at a respectful distance; some, having saluted the Lord with joined palms, sat down at a respectful distance; some, having made known their names and clans in the Lord’s presence, sat down at a respectful distance; some, becoming silent, sat down at a respectful distance. As they were sitting down at a respectful distance, the Lord spoke thus to the brahman householders of Sālā:

“Have you, householders, some satisfactory teacher in whom your faith is grounded?”

“We have no satisfactory teacher, revered sir, in whom our faith is grounded.”

“If you, householders, have no satisfactory teacher, then taking up this sure (*apaṇṇaka*) *dhamma* you should practise it. For, householders, sure is *dhamma*; rightly undertaken, it will long be for your welfare and happiness. And what, householders, is this sure *dhamma*?”

There are, householders, some recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of these views: ‘There is no (result of) gift, there is no (result of) offering, no (result of) sacrifice; there is no fruit or ripening of deeds well done or ill done; there is not this world, there is not a world beyond; there is no (benefit from serving) mother or father; there are no spontaneously arising beings; there are not in the world recluses and brahmans who are faring rightly, proceeding rightly, and who proclaim this world and a world beyond, having realised them by their own super-knowledge.’ But, householders, there are some recluses and brahmans who speak in direct opposition to these recluses and brahmans, and who say this: ‘There is (result of) gift, there is (result of) offering, there is (result of) sacrifice; there is fruit and ripening of deeds well done and ill done; there is this world, there is a world beyond; there is (benefit from serving) mother and father; there are spontaneously arising beings; there are in the world recluses and brahmans who are faring rightly, proceeding rightly, and who proclaim this world and a world beyond, having realised them by their own super-knowledge.’ What do you think about this, householders? Do not these recluses and brahmans speak in direct opposition to one another?”

“Yes, revered sir.”

“As to this, householders, of those recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of these views: ‘There is no (result of) gift ... having realised them by their own super-knowledge,’ this is to be expected for them: Having laid aside these three good things: right conduct of body, right conduct of speech, right conduct of thought, and taking up these three bad things: wrong conduct of body, wrong conduct of speech, wrong conduct of thought, they practise them. What is the reason for this? It is that these worthy recluses and brahmans do not see the peril in wrong things, the vanity, the defilement, nor the advantage, allied to purity, of renouncing them for the good things. And because there is indeed a world beyond, the view of anyone that there is not a world beyond is a false view of him. As there is indeed a world beyond, if anyone has the conception that there is not a world beyond, it is a false conception of his. As there is indeed a world beyond, if anyone utters the speech:

‘There is not a world beyond,’ it is a false speech of his. As there is indeed a world beyond, if anyone says that there is not a world beyond he makes mock of those perfected ones who are knowers of the world beyond. As there is indeed a world beyond, if he convinces others that there is not a world beyond, that convincing of his is against true *dhamma*, and because of that convincing which is against true *dhamma*, he is exalting himself and disparaging others – these are a variety of evil, unskilled states that arise thus because of false view.

Hereupon, householders, an intelligent man reflects thus: ‘If there is not a world beyond, this worthy individual

at the breaking up of the body will make himself safe; but if there is a world beyond, this worthy individual at the breaking up of the body after dying, will arise in a sorrowful way, a bad bourn, the downfall, Niraya Hell. But if it be granted that there is not a world beyond, if this is a true speech of these recluses and brahmans, then the worthy individual is condemned here and now by intelligent persons who say: 'Of bad moral habit is the individual, of false view, he holds the theory of "There is not"' (*nattikavāda*). But if there is indeed a world beyond, thus is there defeat¹ in two ways for this worthy individual: inasmuch as he is condemned here and now by intelligent persons, and inasmuch as at the breaking up of the body after dying he will arise in a sorrowful way, a bad bourn, the downfall, Niraya Hell. Thus this sure *dhamma* has been undertaken imperfectly by him, he has applied himself one-sidedly, he is neglecting the skilled stance (*sammāsankappa*).

Hereupon, householders, of those recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of these views: 'There is (result of) gift.... having realised them by their own super-knowledge,' this is to be expected of them: Having laid aside these three bad things: wrong conduct of body, wrong conduct of speech, wrong conduct of thought, and taking up these three good things: right conduct of body, right conduct of speech, right conduct of thought, they practise them. What is the reason for this? It is that these worthy recluses and brahmans see the peril, the vanity, the defilement in wrong things, and the advantage, allied to purity, of renouncing them for states that are good. And because there is indeed a world beyond, the view of anyone that there is a world beyond is a right view of his. As there is indeed a world beyond, if anyone has the conception that there is a world beyond it is a right conceptions of his. As there is indeed a world beyond, if anyone utters the speech: 'There is a world beyond,' it is a right speech of his. As there is indeed a world beyond, if anyone says that there is a world beyond, he does not make mock of those perfected ones who are knowers of the world beyond. As there is indeed a world beyond, if he convinces others that there is a world beyond, that convincing of his is according to true *dhamma*, and because of this convincing which is in accordance with true *dhamma*, he does not exalt just himself, he does not disparage others. Indeed, before his bad morality is got rid of, good morality is set up. And this right view, right conception, right speech, this non-mocking of the ariyans, the convincing which is in accordance with true *dhamma*, the non-exalting of self, the non-disparaging of others – these are a variety of good states that arise because of right view.

Hereupon, householders, an intelligent man reflects thus: 'If there is a world beyond, this worthy individual at the breaking up of the body after dying will arise in a good bourn, a heaven world. But if it be granted that there is not a world beyond, if this is a true speech of these recluses and brahmans, then this worthy individual is praised here and now by intelligent persons who say: 'Of good moral habit is the individual, of right view, he holds the theory of "There is."' But if there is indeed a world beyond, thus is there victory' in two ways for this worthy individual: inasmuch as he is praised here and now by intelligent persons, and inasmuch as at the breaking up of the body after dying he will arise in a good bourn, a heaven world. Thus this sure *dhamma* has been undertaken perfectly by him, he has applied himself two-sidedly,³ he is neglecting the unskilled stance.

There are, householders, some recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of these views: 'From doing, from making (another) do, from mutilating, from making (another) mutilate, from threatening, from making (another) threaten, from causing grief, from tormenting, from torturing, from making (another) torture, from making onslaught on creatures, from taking what is not given, from house-breaking, from plundering, from robbery, from waiting in ambush, from going after other men's wives, from lying speech from acting (thus) evil is not done. If anyone with a discus having an edge sharp as a razor should make the creatures of this earth into one mass of flesh, into one heap of flesh, from that source there is not evil, there is not the perpetuating² of evil. And if anyone should go to the south bank of the Ganges slaying and striking, mutilating, making (others) mutilate, threatening, making (others) threaten, from that source there is not evil, there is not the perpetuating of evil. And if he should go to the north bank of the Ganges giving, making (others) give, offering, making (others) offer, from that source there is not merit, there is not the perpetuating of merit. There is no merit from giving, from taming oneself, from restraining oneself, from truth-speaking, there is not the perpetuating of merit.' Householders, some recluses and brahmans speak in direct opposition to these recluses and brahmans, they speak thus: 'From doing, from making (another) do ... from lying ... from acting (thus) evil is done. If any one with a discus having an edge sharp as a razor should make the creatures of this earth into one heap of flesh, one mass of flesh, from that source there is evil, there is the perpetuating of evil. And if anyone should go to the south bank of the Ganges slaying and striking ... from that source there is evil, there is the perpetuating of evil. And if he should go to the north bank of the Ganges giving, making (others) give ... from that source there is merit, there is the perpetuating of merit. There is merit from giving, from taming oneself, from restraining oneself, from truth-speaking, there is the perpetuating of merit.' What do you think about this, householders? Do not these recluses and brahmans speak in direct opposition to one another?

"Yes, revered sir."

"Hereupon, householders, of those recluses and brahmans who speak thus and hold these views: 'From doing, from making (another) do ... there is not the perpetuating of merit,' this is to be expected for them: Having laid aside these

1. *kaliggaha*, the losing throw at dice.

2. *agama*, the handing down, tradition; cf. *āgatāgama* as at Vin. iv. 158. one to whom the tradition has been handed down.

three good things: right conduct of body, right conduct of speech, right conduct of thought, and taking up these three bad things: wrong conduct of body, wrong conduct of speech, wrong conduct of thought, they practise them. What is the reason for this? It is that these worthy recluses and brahmins do not see the peril in wrong things, the vanity, the defilement, nor the advantage, allied to purity, of renouncing them for the good things. And because there is indeed effective action,³ the view of anyone that there is not effective action is a false view of his. As there is indeed effective action, if anyone has the conception that there is not effective action it is a false conception of his. As there is indeed effective action, if anyone utters the speech: ‘There is not effective action,’ it is a false speech of his. As there is indeed effective action, if anyone says there is not effective action he is making a mock of those perfected ones who profess effective action (*kiriya*). As there is indeed effective action, if he convinces others that there is not effective action, that convincing of his is against true dhamma, and because of that convincing which is against true *dhamma*, he is exalting himself and disparaging others. Indeed, before his good morality is got rid of, bad morality is set up. And this false view, false conception, false speech, the mocking of the ariyans, the convincing which is against true *dhamma*, the exalting of oneself, the disparaging of others – these are a variety of evil, wrong states that arise because of false view.

Hereupon, householders, an intelligent man reflects thus: ‘If there is not effective action, this worthy individual at the breaking up of the body will make himself safe; but if there is effective action, this worthy individual at the breaking up of the body after dying will arise in a sorrowful way, a bad bourn, the downfall, Niraya Hell. But if it be granted that there is not effective action, if this is a true speech of these worthy recluses and brahmins, then the worthy individual is condemned here and now by intelligent persons who say: “Of bad moral habit is the individual, of false view, he professes ineffective action.”⁴ But if there is indeed effective action, there is thus defeat in two ways for this worthy individual: inasmuch as he is condemned here and now by intelligent persons, and inasmuch as at the breaking up of the body after dying he will arise in a sorrowful way, a bad bourn, the downfall, Niraya Hell. This sure *dhamma* has thus been undertaken imperfectly by him, he has applied himself one-sidedly, he is neglecting the skilled stance.

Hereupon, householders, those recluses and brahmins who speak thus and hold these views: ‘From doing, from making (another) do ... there is the perpetuation of merit,’ this is to be expected for them: Having laid aside these three bad things: wrong conduct of body, wrong conduct of speech, wrong conduct of thought, and taking up these three good things: right conduct of body, right conduct of speech, right conduct of thought, they practise them. What is the reason for this? It is that these worthy recluses and brahmins see the peril in wrong things, the vanity, the defilement, and the advantage, allied to purity, of renouncing them for states that are good. And because there is indeed effective action, the view of anyone that there is effective action is a right view of his. And as there is indeed effective action, if anyone has the conception that there is effective action, it is a right conception of his. And as there is indeed effective action, if anyone utters the speech: ‘There is effective action,’ it is a right speech of his. And as there is indeed effective action, if anyone says that there is effective action, he is not making a mock of those perfected ones who hold the theory of effective action. As there is indeed effective action, if he convinces others that there is effective action, that convincing of his is according to true *dhamma*, and because of this convincing which is in accordance with true *dhamma*, he is not exalting himself, he is not disparaging others. Indeed before his bad morality is got rid of, good morality is set up. And this right view, right conception, right speech, the non-mocking of the ariyans, the convincing which is in accordance with true *dhamma*, the non-exalting of self, the non-disparagement of others – these are a variety of good states which arise because of right view.

Hereupon, householders, an intelligent man reflects thus: ‘If there is effective action, this worthy individual at the breaking up of the body after dying will arise in a good bourn, a heaven world. But if it be granted that there is not effective action, if this is a true speech of these worthy recluses and brahmins, then this worthy individual is praised here and now by intelligent persons who say: ‘Of good moral habit is the individual, of right view, he professes effective action. If there is indeed effective action, thus is there victory in two ways for this worthy individual: inasmuch as he is praised here and now by intelligent persons, and inasmuch as at the breaking up of the body after dying he will arise in a good bourn, in a heaven world. Thus this sure *dhamma* has been undertaken perfectly by him, he has applied himself two-sidedly, he is neglecting the unskilled stance.

There are, householders, some recluses and brahmins who speak thus and are of these views:⁵ ‘There is no cause, no reason for the defilement of creatures, creatures are defiled without cause, without reason. There is no cause, no reason for the purification of creatures, creatures are purified without cause, without reason. There is not strength, there is not energy, there is not human vigour, there is not human effort; all creatures,⁶ all breathing things, all beings, all living things

3. *kiriya*, doing, fulfilment, so a complete act, i.e. act and its effect(s).

4. *akiriya*. Cf. D. i. 53, *akiriya* *vyākāsi*, and A. i. 286 where the view *n’atthi kamma n’atthi kiriyam, n’atti viriyam* is ascribed to Makkhali Gosāla. See also E. J. Thomas, *Hist. Bud. Thought*, p. 72.

5. Also given at 8. iii. 210. At D. i. 53 they are ascribed to Makkhali Gosāla.

6. *MA. iii. 120=DA.I. 161 says creatures, *sattā*, are camels, oxen, donkeys, etc.; “breathers,” *pāṇā*, are those who have one or two faculties; beings,

are without power, without strength, without energy, bent⁷ by fate,⁸ chance,⁹ and nature,¹⁰ they experience pleasure and pains amid the six classes.¹¹ But, householders, there are some recluses and brahmins who speak in direct opposition to these recluses and brahmins, and who say this: ‘There is cause, there is reason for the defilement of creatures, creatures are defiled with cause, with reason. There is cause, there is reason for the purification of creatures, creatures are purified with cause, with reason. There is strength, there is energy, there is human vigour, there is human effort; all creatures, all breathing things, all beings, all living things are not (so) without power, without strength, without energy that they are bent by fate, chance and nature, that they experience pleasure and pain amid the six classes. What do you think about this, householders? Do not these recluses and brahmins speak in direct opposition to one another?’

“Yes, revered sir.”

“Hereupon, householders, those recluses and brahmins who speak thus and are of these views: ‘There is no cause, there is no reason ... amid the six classes,’ this is to be expected for them: Having laid aside the three good things: right conduct of body, right conduct of speech, right conduct of thought, and taking up these three bad things: wrong conduct of body, wrong conduct of speech, wrong conduct of thought, they practise them. What is the reason for this? It is that these worthy recluses and brahmins do not see the peril in wrong things, the vanity, the defilement, nor the advantage, allied to purity, in renouncing them for the good things. And because there is indeed cause, the view of anyone that there is not cause is a false view of his. As there is indeed cause, if anyone has the conception that there is not cause it is a false conception of his. As there is indeed cause, if anyone utters the speech: ‘There is not cause,’ it is a false speech of his. As there is indeed cause, if anyone says there is not cause, he makes mock of those perfected ones who profess that there is cause. As there is indeed cause, if he convinces others that there is not cause, this convincing of his is against true *dhamma*, and because of this convincing which is against true *dhamma*, he is exalting himself and disparaging others. Indeed, before his good morality is got rid of, bad morality is set up. And this false view, false conception, false speech, the mocking of the ariyans, the convincing which is against true *dhamma*, the exalting of oneself, the disparaging of others—these are a variety of evil, wrong states that arise thus because of false view.

Hereupon, householders, an intelligent man reflects thus: ‘If there is not cause, this worthy individual at the breaking up of the body will make himself safe; but if there is cause, this worthy individual at the breaking up of the body after dying will arise in a sorrowful way, a bad bourn, the downfall, Niraya Hell. But if it be granted that there is not cause, if this is a true speech of these recluses and brahmins, then this worthy individual is condemned here and now by intelligent persons who say: “Of bad moral habit is the individual, of false view, he professes that there is not cause.” But if there is indeed cause, thus there is defeat in two ways for this worthy individual: inasmuch as he is condemned here and now by intelligent persons, and inasmuch as on the breaking up of the body after dying he will arise in a sorrowful way, a bad bourn, the downfall, Niraya Hell. This sure *dhamma* has thus been imperfectly undertaken by him, he has applied himself one-sidedly, he is neglecting the skilled stance.

Hereupon, householders, those recluses and brahmins who speak thus and are of these views: ‘There is cause, there is reason ... amid the six classes,’ this is to be expected for them: Having laid aside these three bad things: wrong conduct of body, wrong conduct of speech, wrong conduct of thought, and taking up these three good things: right conduct of body, right conduct of speech, right conduct of thought, they practise them. What is the reason for this? It is that these worthy recluses and brahmins see the peril in wrong things, the vanity, the defilement, the advantage, allied to purity, of renouncing them for good states. And because there is indeed cause, the view of anyone that there is cause is a right view of his. As there is indeed cause, if anyone has the conception that there is cause it is a right conception of his. As there is indeed cause, if anyone utters the speech: ‘There is cause,’ it is a right speech of his. As there is indeed cause, if anyone says that there is cause, he does not make mock of those perfected ones who hold the theory of cause. As there is indeed cause, if he convinces others that there is cause, this convincing of his is in accordance with true *dhamma*, and because of this convincing which is in accordance with true *dhamma*, he does not exalt himself, does not disparage others. Indeed, before his bad morality is got rid of, good morality is set up. And this right view, right conception, right speech, the non-mocking of the ariyans, the convincing which is in accordance with true *dhamma*, the nonexalting of self, the non-disparaging of others—these are a variety of good states that arise because of right view.

Hereupon, householders, an intelligent man reflects thus: ‘If there is indeed cause, this worthy individual at the breaking up of the body after dying will arise in a good bourn, a heaven world. But if it be granted that there is not cause,

7. *parinatā*, also meaning changed, ripened, matured.

8. *niyati*, a word, as used by Makkhali Gosāla, implying determination, necessity. See B. M. Barua, *Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, p. 310; and A. L. Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas*, p. 224.

9. *saṅgati*, meeting together, here of events over which the being has no power or control, see B. M. Barua, *cp. cil.*, p. 311; Basham, *cp. cil.*, p. 225.

10. *bhāva*=*sabhāva*, MA. iii. 120, character, nature, disposition. See Barua, *op. cit.*, p. 311; Basham, *cp. cit.*, p. 226.

11. Of beings. The divisions to which Gosāla’s expression has reference are of colours: black, blue (or green), red, yellow, white, and intensely white. Typical members of the classes are given at MA. iii. 121. Cf. D. iii. 250; A. iii. 383; G.S. iii. 273, and see B. M. Barua, *cp. cil.* p. 309.

if this is a true speech of these worthy recluses and brahmans, then this worthy individual is praised here and now by intelligent persons who say: ‘Of good moral habit is the individual, of right view, he professes that there is cause.’ If there is indeed cause, thus is there victory in two ways for this worthy individual: inasmuch as he is praised here and now by intelligent persons, and inasmuch as on the breaking up of the body after dying he will arise in a good bourn, a heaven world. Thus this sure *dham ma* has been undertaken perfectly by him, he has applied himself twosidedly, he is neglecting the unskilled stance.

There are, householders, some recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of this view: ‘There is not formlessness throughout.’¹² But, householders, there are some recluses and brahmans who are in direct opposition to these recluses and brahmans, and who say this: ‘There is formlessness throughout.’ What do you think about this, householders ? Do not these recluses and brahmans speak in direct opposition to one another?’

“ Yes, revered sir.”

“ Hereupon, householders, an intelligent man reflects thus: ‘Those worthy recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of this view: “There is not formlessness throughout” – this is not seen by me. And those worthy recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of this view: “ There is formlessness throughout” – this is not known by me. And if I, not knowing, not seeing, were to take up one side and define it, saying: “This is the truth, all else is falsehood,” this would not be suitable in me. If this is a true saying of these worthy recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of this view: “ There is not formlessness throughout,” then this situation occurs that surely my uprising will be there where are those *devas* that have form and are made by mind.¹³ But if this is a true saying of those worthy recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of this view: “ There is formlessness throughout,” then this situation occurs that surely my uprising will be there where are those *devas* that are formless, made from perceiving.¹⁴ Concerning what has form, taking up the stick is to be seen, and taking up the sword, quarrel, dispute, contention, strife, slander, lying speech. But there is not this in what is formless throughout.’ So, by reflecting thus, he is one faring along precisely for the disregard of material shapes, for detachment (concerning them) and for their stopping.

There are, householders, some recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of this view: ‘There is not the stopping of becomings¹⁵ throughout.’ But, householders, there are some recluses and brahmans who speak in direct opposition to those recluses and brahmans and who say this: ‘ There is the stopping of becomings throughout.’ What do you think about this, householders ? Do not these recluses and brahmans speak in direct opposition to one another?’

“ Yes, revered sir.”

“ Hereupon, householders, an intelligent man reflects thus: ‘Those worthy recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of this view: “ There is not the stopping of becomings throughout “this is not seen by me. But those worthy recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of this view: “ There is the stopping of becomings throughout” – this is not known by me. And if I, not knowing, not seeing, were to take up one side and define it, saying: “This is the truth, all else is falsehood” – this would not be suitable in me. If this is a true saying of those worthy recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of this view: “ There is not the stopping of becomings throughout,” then this situation occurs that surely my uprising will be there where are those *devas* who are formless, made from perceiving. But if this is a true saying of those worthy recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of this view: “There is the stopping of becomings throughout,” then this situation occurs: that I will attain nibbāna here-now. If this is a true saying of those worthy recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of this view: “ There is not the stopping of becomings throughout,” this view of theirs is close to attachment, close to the fetters, close to delight, close to cleaving, close to grasping. But if this is a true saying of those worthy recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of this view: “ There is the stopping of becomings throughout,” this view of theirs is close to detachment, close to the absence of the fetters, close to the absence of delight, close to the absence of cleaving, close to the absence of grasping.” Through reflecting thus he is one faring along precisely for the disregard of becomings, for detachment (concerning them), and for their stopping.

Householders, there are these four kinds of persons existing in the world.¹⁶ What four ? Here, householders, some person is a tormentor of self, intent on the practice of self-torment. Here, householders, some person is a tormentor of others, intent on the practice of tormenting others. Here, householders, some person is both a self-tormentor, intent on the

12. *n’atthi sabbaso āruppā ti. MA. iii. 122* says there is not a Brahma-world that is formless throughout (or in every way).

13. *manomayā. MA. iii. 122* explains by *jhdnacillainaya*, made by thought in meditation.

14. *saññāmayā. MA. iii. 122* says *arūpajjhātnasaññāya*, made by perception in the perception in the meditation on formlessness.

15. *MA. iii. 123* says that *bhavanirodha* (the stopping of becoming or be. comings) is nibbāna, as does 8. ii. 117, A. v. 9. 1 take *bhava*, in *bhavanirodha*, as a plural to fit the plural *bhavānam* at the end of this clause, see p. 81 below. Reference is no doubt intended to the three becomings, *kāmahava*, *rūpaand arūpabhava*.

16. As in the *Kandaraka Sutta, M. Sta. No. 51. MA. iii. 124* says that the five type of persons who hold the views: There is not, there is no efficient action, there is no cause, there is not formlessness, there is not stopping – become as it were three persons here; and the five who hold the opposite views of There is, etc., become as it were one person, namely the fourth kind. It must therefore be supposed that Bu. thought of the first group as comprising tormentors of self, of others and of both. The second “group” held the right views and are non-tormentors.

practice of tormenting self, and a tormentor of others, intent on the practice of tormenting others. Here, householders, some person is neither a self-tormentor intent on the practice of self-torment, nor a tormentor of others intent on the practice of tormenting others. He, neither a self-tormentor nor a tormentor of others, is here-now allayed, quenched, become cool, an experiencer of bliss that lives with self Brahma-become.

And which, householders, is the self-tormentor, intent on the practice of self-torment ? In this case, householders, some person comes to be unclothed, flouting life's decencies, licking his hands (after meals) ... (as in *the Kandarakasutta*) ... Thus in many a way does he live intent on the practice of mortifying and tormenting his body. Householders, this person is called a self-tormentor, intent on the practice of self-torment.

And which, householders, is the tormentor of others, intent on the practice of tormenting others ? In this case, householders, some person is a cattle-butcher, or pig-killer, fowler ... or one of those others who follow a bloody calling. This is the person, householders, who is called a tormentor of others, intent on the practice of tormenting others.

And which, householders, is the person who is a self-tormentor, intent on the practice of self-torment, and also a tormentor of others, intent on the practice of tormenting others ? In this case, householders, some person is a noble anointed king or a very rich brahman Those who are called his slaves or messengers or workpeople, they, scared of danger, with tearful faces and crying, set about their preparations. This, householders, is called the person who is a self-tormentor, intent on the practice of self-torment and also a tormentor of others, intent on the practice of tormenting others.

And which, householders, is the person who is neither a self-tormentor intent on the practice of self-torment, nor a tormentor of others intent on the practice of tormenting others, and who, neither a self-tormentor nor a tormentor of others, is here-now allayed, quenched, become cool, an experiencer of bliss that lives with self Brahma-become ? In this case, householders, a Tathāgata, arises in the world Destroyed is birth, brought to a close the Brahma-faring, done is what was to be done, there is no more of being such or so. This, householders, is called the person who is neither a self-tormentor, not intent on the practice of tormenting self, nor a tormentor of others, not intent on the practice of tormenting others, and who, neither a self-tormentor nor a tormentor of others, is here-now allayed, quenched, become cool, an experiencer of bliss that lives with self Brahma-become."

When this had been said, the brahman householders of Sālā spoke thus to the Lord: "Excellent, good Gotama; good Gotama, it is excellent. It is as if, good Gotama, one might set upright what had been upset ... even so in many a figure has *dhamma* been made clear by the good Gotama. We are going to the revered Gotama for refuge and to *dhamma* and to the Order of monks. May the good Gotama accept us as lay-disciples going for refuge from this day forth for as long as life lasts."

4. Pali Text of Sutta

10. Apaṇṇakasuttaṃ

92. Evaṃ me suttaṃ— ekaṃ samayaṃ bhagavā kosalesu cārikaṃ caramāno mahatā bhikkhusaṅghena saddhiṃ yena sālā nāma kosalanāṃ brāhmaṇagāmo tadavasari. Assosum kho sāleyyakā brāhmaṇagahapatikā— "samaṇo khalu bho gotamo sakyaputto sakyakulā pabbajito kosalesu cārikaṃ caramāno mahatā bhikkhusaṅghena saddhiṃ sālāṃ (2.0063) anuppatto. Taṃ kho pana bhavantaṃ gotamaṃ evaṃ kalyāṇo kittisaddo abbhuggato— 'itipi so bhagavā arahamaṃ sammāsambuddho vijjācaraṇasampanno sugato lokavidū anuttaro purisadammasārathi satthā devamanussānaṃ buddho bhagavā'ti. So imaṃ lokaṃ sadevakaṃ samārakaṃ sabrahmakaṃ sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiṃ pajamaṃ sadevamanussaṃ sayamaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti. So dhammaṃ deseti ādikalyāṇaṃ majjhikalyāṇaṃ pariyośanakalyāṇaṃ sātthaṃ sabyañjanaṃ, kevalaparipuṇṇaṃ parisuddhaṃ brahmacariyaṃ pakāseti. Sādhu kho pana tathārūpānaṃ arahataṃ dassanaṃ hoti'ti. Atha kho sāleyyakā brāhmaṇagahapatikā yena bhagavā tenupasaṅkamimsu; upasaṅkamitvā appekacce bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdimsu. Appekacce bhagavatā saddhiṃ sammodiṃsu; sammodanīyaṃ kathaṃ sāraṇīyaṃ vītisāretvā ekamantaṃ nisīdimsu. Appekacce yena bhagavā tenañjaliṃ paṇāmetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdimsu. Appekacce bhagavato santike nāmagottaṃ sāvetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdimsu. Appekacce tuṅhībhūtā ekamantaṃ nisīdimsu.

93. Ekamantaṃ nisinne kho sāleyyake brāhmaṇagahapatike bhagavā etadavoca— "atthi pana vo, gahapatayo, koci manāpo satthā yasmiṃ vo ākāravatī saddhā paṭiladdhā'ti? "Natthi kho no, bhante, koci manāpo satthā yasmiṃ no ākāravatī saddhā paṭiladdhā'ti. "Manāpaṃ vo, gahapatayo, satthāraṃ alabhantehi ayaṃ apaṇṇako dhammo samādāya vattitabbo. Apaṇṇako hi, gahapatayo, dhammo samatto samādāno, so vo bhavissati dīgharattaṃ hitāya sukhāya. Katamo ca, gahapatayo, apaṇṇako dhammo?"

94. "Santi, gahapatayo, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— 'natthi dinnamaṃ, natthi yitthaṃ, natthi hutamaṃ; natthi sukatadukkaṭānaṃ, kammānaṃ phalaṃ vipāko, natthi ayaṃ loko, natthi paro loko; natthi mātā, natthi pitā; natthi sattā opapātikā; natthi loke samaṇabrāhmaṇā sammaggatā, sammā paṭipannā ye imaṅca lokaṃ paraṅca lokaṃ sayamaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedentī'ti. Tesamaṃyeva kho, gahapatayo, samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ (2.0064) eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā ujuvipaccanīkavādā. Te evamāhaṃsu— 'atthi dinnamaṃ, atthi yitthaṃ, atthi hutamaṃ; atthi

sukatadukkaṭṭānaṃ kammānaṃ phalaṃ vipāko; atthi ayaṃ loko, atthi paro loko; atthi mātā, atthi pitā; atthi sattā opapātikā; atthi loke samaṇabrāhmaṇā sammaggaṭṭā sammā paṭipannā ye imaṅca lokaṃ paraṅca lokaṃ sayāṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedentī’ti. Taṃ kiṃ maññatha, gahapatayo– ‘nanume samaṇabrāhmaṇā aññamaññassa ujuvipaccanīkavādā’? “Evaṃ, bhante”.

95. “Tatra, gahapatayo, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino– ‘natthi dinnāṃ, natthi yitṭhaṃ ...pe... ye imaṅca lokaṃ paraṅca lokaṃ sayāṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedentī’ti tesametaṃ paṭikaṅkhaṃ: yamidaṃ , kāyasucaritaṃ, vacīsucaritaṃ, manosucaritaṃ– ime tayo kusale dhamme abhinivajjetvā , yamidaṃ , kāyaduccaritaṃ, vacīduccaritaṃ, manoduccaritaṃ– ime tayo akusale dhamme samādāya vattissanti. Taṃ kissa hetu? Na hi te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā passanti akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ ādīnavaṃ okāraṃ saṃkilesaṃ, kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ nekkhamme ānisaṃsaṃ vodānapakkhaṃ. Santaṃyeva pana paraṃ lokaṃ ‘natthi paro loko’ tissa diṭṭhi hoti; sāssa hoti micchādiṭṭhi. Santaṃyeva kho pana paraṃ lokaṃ ‘natthi paro loko’ti saṅkappeti; svāssa hoti micchāsaṅkappo. Santaṃyeva kho pana paraṃ lokaṃ ‘natthi paro loko’ti vācaṃ bhāsati; sāssa hoti micchāvācā. Santaṃyeva kho pana paraṃ lokaṃ ‘natthi paro loko’ti āha; ye te arahanto paralokaviduno tesamayaṃ paccanīkaṃ karoti. Santaṃyeva kho pana paraṃ lokaṃ ‘natthi paro loko’ti paraṃ saññāpeti ;, sāssa hoti asaddhammasaññatti ,. Tāya ca pana asaddhammasaññattiyā attānukkaṃseti, paraṃ vambheti. Iti pubbeva kho panassa susīlyāṃ pahīnaṃ hoti, dussīlyāṃ paccupaṭṭhitāṃ– ayaṅca micchādiṭṭhi micchāsaṅkappo micchāvācā ariyānaṃ paccanīkatā asaddhammasaññatti attukkaṃsanā paravambhanā. Evamassime , aneke pāpakā akusalā dhammā sambhavanti micchādiṭṭhipaccayā.

“Tatra (2.0065), gahapatayo, viññū puriso iti paṭisaṅcikkhati– ‘sace kho natthi paro loko evamayaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo kāyassa bhedaṃ sotthimattānaṃ karissati; sace kho atthi paro loko evamayaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ maraṇā apāyaṃ duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ nirayaṃ upapajjissati. Kāmaṃ kho pana māhu paro loko, hotu nesaṃ bhavataṃ samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ saccaṃ vacanaṃ; atha ca panāyaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo diṭṭheva dhamme viññūnaṃ gārayho– dussīlo purisapuggalo micchādiṭṭhi natthikavādo’ti. Sace kho attheva paro loko, evaṃ imassa bhoto purisapuggalassa ubhayattha kaliggaho– yaṅca diṭṭheva dhamme viññūnaṃ gārayho, yaṅca kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ maraṇā apāyaṃ duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ nirayaṃ upapajjissati. Evamassāyaṃ apaṇṇako dhammo dussamatto samādinno, ekaṃsaṃ pharivā tiṭṭhati, riñcati kusalaṃ ṭhānaṃ.

96. “Tatra, gahapatayo, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino– ‘atthi dinnāṃ ...pe... ye imaṅca lokaṃ paraṅca lokaṃ sayāṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedentī’ti tesametaṃ paṭikaṅkhaṃ: yamidaṃ kāyaduccaritaṃ, vacīduccaritaṃ, manoduccaritaṃ– ime tayo akusale dhamme abhinivajjetvā yamidaṃ kāyasucaritaṃ, vacīsucaritaṃ, manosucaritaṃ– ime tayo kusale dhamme samādāya vattissanti. Taṃ kissa hetu? Passanti hi te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ ādīnavaṃ okāraṃ saṃkilesaṃ, kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ nekkhamme ānisaṃsaṃ vodānapakkhaṃ. Santaṃyeva kho pana paraṃ lokaṃ ‘atthi paro loko’ tissa diṭṭhi hoti; sāssa hoti sammādiṭṭhi. Santaṃyeva kho pana paraṃ lokaṃ ‘atthi paro loko’ti saṅkappeti; svāssa hoti sammāsaṅkappo. Santaṃyeva kho pana paraṃ lokaṃ ‘atthi paro loko’ti vācaṃ bhāsati; sāssa hoti sammāvācā. Santaṃyeva kho pana paraṃ lokaṃ ‘atthi paro loko’ti āha; ye te arahanto paralokaviduno tesamayaṃ na paccanīkaṃ karoti. Santaṃyeva kho pana paraṃ lokaṃ ‘atthi paro loko’ti paraṃ saññāpeti; sāssa hoti saddhammasaññatti. Tāya ca pana saddhammasaññattiyā nevattānukkaṃseti, na paraṃ vambheti. Iti pubbeva kho panassa dussīlyāṃ pahīnaṃ hoti, susīlyāṃ paccupaṭṭhitāṃ– ayaṅca sammādiṭṭhi sammāsaṅkappo sammāvācā ariyānaṃ apaccanīkatā saddhammasaññatti anattukkaṃsanā (2.0066) aparavambhanā. Evamassime aneke kusalā dhammā sambhavanti sammādiṭṭhipaccayā.

“Tatra, gahapatayo, viññū puriso iti paṭisaṅcikkhati– ‘sace kho atthi paro loko, evamayaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ maraṇā sugatiṃ saggāṃ lokaṃ upapajjissati. Kāmaṃ kho pana māhu paro loko, hotu nesaṃ bhavataṃ samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ saccaṃ vacanaṃ; atha ca panāyaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo diṭṭheva dhamme viññūnaṃ pāsamsaṃ– sīlavā purisapuggalo sammādiṭṭhi atthikavādo’ti. Sace kho attheva paro loko, evaṃ imassa bhoto purisapuggalassa ubhayattha kaṭṭagaho– yaṅca diṭṭheva dhamme viññūnaṃ pāsamsaṃ, yaṅca kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ maraṇā sugatiṃ saggāṃ lokaṃ upapajjissati. Evamassāyaṃ apaṇṇako dhammo susamatto samādinno, ubhayaṃsaṃ pharivā tiṭṭhati, riñcati akusalaṃ ṭhānaṃ.

97. “Santi, gahapatayo, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino– ‘karoto kārayato, chindato chedāpayato, pacato pācāpayato, socayato socāpayato, kilamato kilamāpayato, phandato phandāpayato, pāṇamatipātayato , adinnaṃ ādiyato, sandhiṃ chindato, nillopaṃ harato, ekāgārikaṃ karoto, paripantho tiṭṭhato, paradāraṃ gacchato, musā bhaṇato; karoto na karīyati pāpaṃ. Khurapariyantena cepi cakkena yo imissā pathaviyā pāṇe ekaṃ maṃsakhalaṃ ekaṃ maṃsapuñjaṃ kareyya, natthi tatonidānaṃ pāpaṃ, natthi pāpassa āgamo. Dakkhiṇāncepi gaṅgāya tīraṃ gaccheyya hananto ghātento, chindanto chedāpento, pacanto pācento; natthi tatonidānaṃ pāpaṃ, natthi pāpassa āgamo. Uttarañcepi gaṅgāya tīraṃ gaccheyya dadanto dāpento, yajanto yajāpento; natthi tatonidānaṃ puññaṃ, natthi puññaṃ āgamo. Dānena damena saṃyamena saccavajjena , natthi puññaṃ, natthi puññaṃ āgamo’ti. Tesamāyeva kho, gahapatayo, samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā ujuvipaccanīkavādā te evamāhaṃsu– ‘karoto kārayato, chindato chedāpayato, pacato pācāpayato, socayato (2.0067) socāpayato, kilamato kilamāpayato, phandato phandāpayato, pāṇamatipātayato, adinnaṃ ādiyato, sandhiṃ chindato, nillopaṃ harato,

ekāgārikam karoto, paripanthē tiṭṭhato, paradāram gacchato, musā bhaṇato; karoto karīyati pāpaṃ. Khurapariyantena cepi cakkena yo imissā pathaviyā pāṇe ekaṃ maṃsakhalaṃ ekaṃ maṃsapuñjaṃ kareyya, atthi tatonidānaṃ pāpaṃ, atthi pāpassa āgamo. Dakkhiṇaṅcepi gaṅgāya tīraṃ gaccheyya hananto ghātento, chindanto chedāpento, pacanto pācento; atthi tatonidānaṃ pāpaṃ, atthi pāpassa āgamo. Uttaraṅcepi gaṅgāya tīraṃ gaccheyya dadanto dāpento, yajanto yajāpento; atthi tatonidānaṃ puññaṃ, atthi puññaṃ āgamo. Dānena damena saṃyamena saccavajjena atthi puññaṃ, atthi puññaṃ āgamo'ti. Taṃ kiṃ maññaṭha, gahapatayo, nanume samaṇabrāhmaṇā aññaṃaññaṃ ujuvipaccanīkavādā'ti? “Evaṃ, bhante”.

98. “Tatra, gahapatayo, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘karoto kārayato, chindato chedāpayato, pacato pācāpayato, socayato socāpayato, kilamato kilamāpayato, phandato phandāpayato, pāṇamatipātayato, adinnaṃ ādiyato, sandhiṃ chindato, nillopaṃ harato, ekāgārikam karoto, paripanthē tiṭṭhato, paradāram gacchato, musā bhaṇato; karoto na karīyati pāpaṃ. Khurapariyantena cepi cakkena yo imissā pathaviyā pāṇe ekaṃ maṃsakhalaṃ ekaṃ maṃsapuñjaṃ kareyya, natthi tatonidānaṃ pāpaṃ, natthi pāpassa āgamo. Dakkhiṇaṅcepi gaṅgāya tīraṃ gaccheyya hananto ghātento ...pe... dānena damena saṃyamena saccavajjena natthi puññaṃ, natthi puññaṃ āgamo'ti tesametaṃ pāṭikaṅkhaṃ: yamidaṃ kāyasucaritaṃ, vacīsucaritaṃ, manosucaritaṃ— ime tayo kusale dhamme abhinivajjetvā yamidaṃ kāyaduccaritaṃ, vacīduccaritaṃ, manoduccaritaṃ— ime tayo akusale dhamme samādāya vattissanti. Taṃ kissa hetu? Na hi te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā passanti akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ ādīnavaṃ okāraṃ saṃkilesaṃ, kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ nekkhamme ānisaṃsaṃ vodānapakkhaṃ. Santaṃyeva kho pana kiriyāṃ ‘natthi kiriyā’ tissa diṭṭhi hoti; sāssa hoti micchādiṭṭhi. Santaṃyeva kho pana kiriyāṃ ‘natthi kiriyā’ti saṅkappeti; svāssa hoti (2.0068) micchāsaṅkappo. Santaṃyeva kho pana kiriyāṃ ‘natthi kiriyā’ti vācaṃ bhāsati; sāssa hoti micchāvācā. Santaṃyeva kho pana kiriyāṃ ‘natthi kiriyā’ti āha, ye te arahanto kiriyavādā tesamayaṃ paccanīkaṃ karoti. Santaṃyeva kho pana kiriyāṃ ‘natthi kiriyā’ti paraṃ saññāpeti; sāssa hoti asaddhammasaññatti. Tāya ca pana asaddhammasaññattiyā attānukkamseti, paraṃ vambheti. Iti pubbeva kho panassa susīlyāṃ pahīnaṃ hoti, dussīlyāṃ paccupaṭṭhitaṃ— ayaṅca micchādiṭṭhi micchāsaṅkappo micchāvācā ariyānaṃ paccanīkatā asaddhammasaññatti attukkamaṇā paravambhanā. Evamassime aneke pāpakā akusalā dhammā sambhavanti micchādiṭṭhipaccayā.

“Tatra, gahapatayo, viññū puriso iti paṭisaṅcikkhati— ‘sace kho natthi kiriyā, evamayaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo kāyassa bhedaṃ sotthimattānaṃ karissati; sace kho atthi kiriyā evamayaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ maraṇā apāyaṃ duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ nirayaṃ upapajjissati. Kāmaṃ kho pana māhu kiriyā, hotu nesaṃ bhavataṃ samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ saccaṃ vacanaṃ; atha ca panāyaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo diṭṭheva dhamme viññūnaṃ gārayho— dussīlo purisapuggalo micchādiṭṭhi akiriyavādo'ti. Sace kho attheva kiriyā, evaṃ imassa bhoto purisapuggalassa ubhayattha kaliggaḥo— yaṅca diṭṭheva dhamme viññūnaṃ gārayho, yaṅca kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ maraṇā apāyaṃ duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ nirayaṃ upapajjissati. Evamassāyaṃ apaṇṇako dhammo dussamatto samādinnō, ekaṃsaṃ pharivā tiṭṭhati, riñcati kusalaṃ ṭhānaṃ.

99. “Tatra, gahapatayo, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘karoto kārayato, chindato chedāpayato, pacato pācāpayato, socayato socāpayato, kilamato kilamāpayato, phandato phandāpayato, pāṇamatipātayato, adinnaṃ ādiyato, sandhiṃ chindato, nillopaṃ harato, ekāgārikam karoto, paripanthē tiṭṭhato, paradāram gacchato, musā bhaṇato; karoto karīyati pāpaṃ. Khurapariyantena cepi cakkena yo imissā pathaviyā pāṇe ekaṃ maṃsakhalaṃ ekaṃ maṃsapuñjaṃ kareyya, atthi tatonidānaṃ pāpaṃ, atthi pāpassa āgamo. Dakkhiṇaṅcepi gaṅgāya tīraṃ gaccheyya hananto ghātento, chindanto (2.0069) chedāpento, pacanto pācento, atthi tatonidānaṃ pāpaṃ, atthi pāpassa āgamo. Uttaraṅcepi gaṅgāya tīraṃ gaccheyya dadanto dāpento, yajanto yajāpento, atthi tatonidānaṃ puññaṃ, atthi puññaṃ āgamo. Dānena damena saṃyamena saccavajjena atthi puññaṃ, atthi puññaṃ āgamo'ti tesametaṃ pāṭikaṅkhaṃ: yamidaṃ kāyaduccaritaṃ, vacīduccaritaṃ, manoduccaritaṃ— ime tayo akusale dhamme abhinivajjetvā yamidaṃ kāyasucaritaṃ, vacīsucaritaṃ, manosucaritaṃ— ime tayo kusale dhamme samādāya vattissanti. Taṃ kissa hetu? Passanti hi te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ ādīnavaṃ okāraṃ saṃkilesaṃ, kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ nekkhamme ānisaṃsaṃ vodānapakkhaṃ. Santaṃyeva kho pana kiriyāṃ ‘atthi kiriyā’ tissa diṭṭhi hoti; sāssa hoti sammādiṭṭhi. Santaṃyeva kho pana kiriyāṃ ‘atthi kiriyā’ti saṅkappeti; svāssa hoti sammāsaṅkappo. Santaṃyeva kho pana kiriyāṃ ‘atthi kiriyā’ti vācaṃ bhāsati; sāssa hoti sammāvācā. Santaṃyeva kho pana kiriyāṃ ‘atthi kiriyā’ti āha; ye te arahanto kiriyavādā tesamayaṃ na paccanīkaṃ karoti. Santaṃyeva kho pana kiriyāṃ ‘atthi kiriyā’ti paraṃ saññāpeti; sāssa hoti saddhammasaññatti. Tāya ca pana saddhammasaññattiyā nevattānukkamseti, na paraṃ vambheti. Iti pubbeva kho panassa dussīlyāṃ pahīnaṃ hoti, susīlyāṃ paccupaṭṭhitaṃ— ayaṅca sammādiṭṭhi sammāsaṅkappo sammāvācā ariyānaṃ apaccanīkatā saddhammasaññatti anattukkamaṇā aparavambhanā. Evamassime aneke kusalā dhammā sambhavanti sammādiṭṭhipaccayā.

“Tatra, gahapatayo, viññū puriso iti paṭisaṅcikkhati— ‘sace kho atthi kiriyā, evamayaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ maraṇā sugatiṃ saggam lokam upapajjissati. Kāmaṃ kho pana māhu kiriyā, hotu nesaṃ bhavataṃ samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ saccaṃ vacanaṃ; atha ca panāyaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo diṭṭheva dhamme viññūnaṃ pāsaṃso— sīlavā purisapuggalo sammādiṭṭhi kiriyavādo'ti. Sace kho attheva kiriyā, evaṃ imassa bhoto purisapuggalassa ubhayattha kaṭaggaho— yaṅca diṭṭheva dhamme viññūnaṃ pāsaṃso, yaṅca kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ maraṇā sugatiṃ saggam lokam upapajjissati. Evamassāyaṃ apaṇṇako dhammo susamatto samādinnō, ubhayaṃsaṃ

pharivā tiṭṭhati, riñcati akusalam ṭhānaṃ.

100. “Santi (2.0070), gahapatayo, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘natthi hetu, natthi paccayo sattānaṃ saṃkilesāya; ahetū appaccayā sattā saṃkilissanti. Natthi hetu, natthi paccayo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā; ahetū appaccayā sattā visujjhanti. Natthi balaṃ, natthi vīriyaṃ, natthi purisathāmo, natthi purisaparakkamo; sabbe sattā sabbe paṇā sabbe bhūtā sabbe jīvā avasā abalā avīriyā niyatisaṃgatibhāvaparīṇatā chasvevābhijātīsu sukhadukkhaṃ paṭisaṃvedentī’ti. Tesamyeva kho, gahapatayo, samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā ujuvipaccanīkavādā. Te evamāhaṃsu— ‘atthi hetu, atthi paccayo sattānaṃ saṃkilesāya; sahetū sappaccayā sattā saṃkilissanti. Atthi hetu, atthi paccayo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā; sahetū sappaccayā sattā visujjhanti. Atthi balaṃ, atthi vīriyaṃ, atthi purisathāmo, atthi purisaparakkamo; na sabbe sattā sabbe paṇā sabbe bhūtā sabbe jīvā avasā abalā avīriyā, niyatisaṃgatibhāvaparīṇatā chasvevābhijātīsu sukhadukkhaṃ paṭisaṃvedentī’ti. Taṃ kiṃ maññatha, gahapatayo, nanume samaṇabrāhmaṇā aññaṃaññaṃ ujuvipaccanīkavādā’ti? ‘Evaṃ, bhante’.

101. “Tatra, gahapatayo, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘natthi hetu, natthi paccayo sattānaṃ saṃkilesāya; ahetū appaccayā sattā saṃkilissanti. Natthi hetu, natthi paccayo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā; ahetū appaccayā sattā visujjhanti. Natthi balaṃ, natthi vīriyaṃ, natthi purisathāmo, natthi purisaparakkamo; sabbe sattā sabbe paṇā sabbe bhūtā sabbe jīvā avasā abalā avīriyā niyatisaṃgatibhāvaparīṇatā chasvevābhijātīsu sukhadukkhaṃ paṭisaṃvedentī’ti tesametam pāṭikaṅkhaṃ: yamidaṃ kāyasucaritaṃ, vacīsucaritaṃ, manosucaritaṃ— ime tayo kusale dhamme abhinivajjetvā yamidaṃ kāyaduccaritaṃ, vacīduccaritaṃ, manoduccaritaṃ— ime tayo akusale dhamme samādāya vattissanti. Taṃ kissa hetu? Na hi te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā passanti akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ ādīnaṃ okāraṃ saṃkilesaṃ, kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ nekkhamme ānisaṃsaṃ vodānapakkhaṃ. Santaṃyeva kho pana hetuṃ ‘natthi (2.0071) hetū’ tissa diṭṭhi hoti; sāssa hoti micchādiṭṭhi. Santaṃyeva kho pana hetuṃ ‘natthi hetū’ti saṅkappeti; svāssa hoti micchāsaṅkappo. Santaṃyeva kho pana hetuṃ ‘natthi hetū’ti vācaṃ bhāsati; sāssa hoti micchāvācā. Santaṃyeva kho pana hetuṃ ‘natthi hetū’ti āha; ye te arahanto hetuvādā tesamayaṃ paccanīkaṃ karoti. Santaṃyeva kho pana hetuṃ ‘natthi hetū’ti paraṃ saññāpeti; sāssa hoti asaddhammasaññatti. Tāya ca pana asaddhammasaññattiyā attānukkaṃseti, paraṃ vambheti. Iti pubbeva kho panassa susīlyaṃ pahīnaṃ hoti, dussīlyaṃ paccupaṭṭhitaṃ— ayañca micchādiṭṭhi micchāsaṅkappo micchāvācā ariyānaṃ paccanīkatā asaddhammasaññatti attānukkaṃsanā paravambhanā. Evamassime aneke pāpakā akusalā dhammā sambhavanti micchādiṭṭhipaccayā.

“Tatra, gahapatayo, viññū puriso iti paṭisañcikkhati— ‘sace kho natthi hetu, evamayaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ maraṇā sotthimattānaṃ karissati; sace kho atthi hetu, evamayaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ maraṇā apāyaṃ duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ nirayaṃ upapajjissati. Kāmaṃ kho pana māhu hetu, hotu nesam bhavataṃ samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ saccaṃ vacanaṃ; atha ca panāyaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo diṭṭheva dhamme viññūnaṃ gārayho— dussīlo purisapuggalo micchādiṭṭhi ahetukavādo’ti. Sace kho attheva hetu, evaṃ imassa bhoṭo purisapuggalassa ubhayattha kaliggaho— yañca diṭṭheva dhamme viññūnaṃ gārayho, yañca kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ maraṇā apāyaṃ duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ nirayaṃ upapajjissati. Evamassāyaṃ apaṇṇako dhammo dussamatto samādīno, ekaṃsaṃ pharivā tiṭṭhati, riñcati kusalam ṭhānaṃ.

102. “Tatra, gahapatayo, ye te samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘atthi hetu, atthi paccayo sattānaṃ saṃkilesāya; sahetū sappaccayā sattā saṃkilissanti. Atthi hetu, atthi paccayo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā; sahetū sappaccayā sattā visujjhanti. Atthi balaṃ, atthi vīriyaṃ, atthi purisathāmo, atthi purisaparakkamo; na sabbe sattā sabbe paṇā sabbe bhūtā sabbe jīvā avasā abalā avīriyā niyatisaṃgatibhāvaparīṇatā chasvevābhijātīsu sukhadukkhaṃ paṭisaṃvedentī’ti tesametam pāṭikaṅkhaṃ: yamidaṃ kāyaduccaritaṃ, vacīduccaritaṃ, manoduccaritaṃ— ime tayo (2.0072) akusale dhamme abhinivajjetvā yamidaṃ kāyasucaritaṃ, vacīsucaritaṃ, manosucaritaṃ— ime tayo kusale dhamme samādāya vattissanti. Taṃ kissa hetu? Passanti hi te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ ādīnaṃ okāraṃ saṃkilesaṃ, kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ nekkhamme ānisaṃsaṃ vodānapakkhaṃ. Santaṃyeva kho pana hetuṃ ‘atthi hetū’ tissa diṭṭhi hoti; sāssa hoti sammādiṭṭhi. Santaṃyeva kho pana hetuṃ ‘atthi hetū’ti saṅkappeti; svāssa hoti sammāsaṅkappo. Santaṃyeva kho pana hetuṃ ‘atthi hetū’ti vācaṃ bhāsati; sāssa hoti sammāvācā. Santaṃyeva kho pana hetuṃ ‘atthi hetū’ti āha, ye te arahanto hetuvādā tesamayaṃ na paccanīkaṃ karoti. Santaṃyeva kho pana hetuṃ ‘atthi hetū’ti paraṃ saññāpeti; sāssa hoti saddhammasaññatti. Tāya ca pana saddhammasaññattiyā nevattānukkaṃseti, na paraṃ vambheti. Iti pubbeva kho panassa dussīlyaṃ pahīnaṃ hoti, susīlyaṃ paccupaṭṭhitaṃ— ayañca sammādiṭṭhi sammāsaṅkappo sammāvācā ariyānaṃ apaccanīkatā saddhammasaññatti anattukkaṃsanā aparavambhanā. Evamassime aneke kusalā dhammā sambhavanti sammādiṭṭhipaccayā.

“Tatra, gahapatayo, viññū puriso iti paṭisañcikkhati— ‘sace kho atthi hetu, evamayaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ maraṇā sugatiṃ saggaṃ lokaṃ upapajjissati. Kāmaṃ kho pana māhu hetu, hotu nesam bhavataṃ samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ saccaṃ vacanaṃ; atha ca panāyaṃ bhavaṃ purisapuggalo diṭṭheva dhamme viññūnaṃ pāsaṃso— sīlavā purisapuggalo sammādiṭṭhi hetuvādo’ti. Sace kho atthi hetu, evaṃ imassa bhoṭo purisapuggalassa ubhayattha kaṭaggaho— yañca diṭṭheva dhamme viññūnaṃ pāsaṃso, yañca kāyassa bhedaṃ paraṃ maraṇā sugatiṃ saggaṃ lokaṃ upapajjissati. Evamassāyaṃ apaṇṇako dhammo susamatto samādīno, ubhayaṃsaṃ pharivā tiṭṭhati, riñcati akusalam ṭhānaṃ.

103. “Santi, gahapatayo, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘natthi sabbaso āruppā’ti. Tesamyeva kho,

gahapatayo, samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā ujuvipaccanīkavādā. Te evamāhaṃsu— ‘atthi sabbaso āruppā’ti. Taṃ kiṃ maññaṭha, gahapatayo, nanume samaṇabrāhmaṇā aññaṃaññaṃ ujuvipaccanīkavādā’ti? “Evaṃ, bhante”. “Tatra (2.0073), gahapatayo, viññū puriso iti paṭisaṅkikkhati— ye kho te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘natthi sabbaso āruppā’ti, idaṃ me adiṭṭhaṃ; yepi te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘atthi sabbaso āruppā’ti, idaṃ me aviditaṃ. Ahañceva , kho pana ajānanto apassanto ekaṃsena ādāya vohareyyaṃ— idameva saccam, moghamaññanti, na metaṃ assa patirūpaṃ. Ye kho te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘natthi sabbaso āruppā’ti, sace tesam bhavataṃ samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ saccam vacanaṃ, ṭhānametaṃ vijjati— ye te devā rūpino manomayā, apaṇṇakaṃ me tatrūpapatti bhavissati. Ye pana te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘atthi sabbaso āruppā’ti, sace tesam bhavataṃ samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ saccam vacanaṃ, ṭhānametaṃ vijjati— ye te devā arūpino saññāmayā, apaṇṇakaṃ me tatrūpapatti bhavissati. Dissanti kho pana rūpādhikaraṇaṃ , daṇḍādāna-satthādāna-kalaha-viggaha-vivāda-tuvaṃtuvatvaṃ-pesuñña-musāvādā. ‘Natthi kho panetaṃ sabbaso arūpe’”ti. So iti paṭisaṅkhāya rūpānaṃyeva nibbidāya virāgāya nirodhāya paṭipanno hoti.

104. “Santi, gahapatayo, eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘natthi sabbaso bhavanirodho’ti. Tesam yeva kho, gahapatayo, samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā ujuvipaccanīkavādā. Te evamāhaṃsu— ‘atthi sabbaso bhavanirodho’ti. Taṃ kiṃ maññaṭha, gahapatayo, nanume samaṇabrāhmaṇā aññaṃaññaṃ ujuvipaccanīkavādā’ti? “Evaṃ, bhante”. “Tatra, gahapatayo, viññū puriso iti paṭisaṅkikkhati— ye kho te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘natthi sabbaso bhavanirodho’ti, idaṃ me adiṭṭhaṃ; yepi te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘atthi sabbaso bhavanirodho’ti, idaṃ me aviditaṃ. Ahañceva kho pana ajānanto apassanto ekaṃsena ādāya vohareyyaṃ— idameva saccam, moghamaññanti, na metaṃ assa patirūpaṃ. Ye kho te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘natthi sabbaso bhavanirodho’ti, sace tesam bhavataṃ samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ saccam vacanaṃ, ṭhānametaṃ vijjati— ye te devā arūpino saññāmayā apaṇṇakaṃ me tatrūpapatti bhavissati. Ye pana te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘atthi sabbaso bhavanirodho’ti, sace tesam bhavataṃ samaṇabrāhmaṇānaṃ saccam vacanaṃ, ṭhānametaṃ vijjati— yaṃ diṭṭheva dhamme parinibbāyissāmi. Ye kho te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘natthi sabbaso bhavanirodho’ti, tesamayaṃ diṭṭhi sārāgāya , santike, saṃyogāya santike, abhinandanāya santike, ajjhosānāya santike, upādānāya santike. Ye pana te bhonto samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino— ‘atthi sabbaso bhavanirodho’ti, tesamayaṃ diṭṭhi asārāgāya santike, asaṃyogāya santike, anabhinandanāya santike, anajjhosānāya santike, anupādānāya santike’”ti. So iti paṭisaṅkhāya bhavānaṃyeva nibbidāya virāgāya nirodhāya paṭipanno hoti.

105. “Cattārome, gahapatayo, puggalā santo saṃvijjamānā lokasmiṃ. Katame cattāro? Idha, gahapatayo, ekacco puggalo attantapo hoti attaparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto. Idha, gahapatayo, ekacco puggalo parantapo hoti paraparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto. Idha, gahapatayo, ekacco puggalo attantapo ca hoti attaparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto parantapo ca paraparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto. Idha, gahapatayo, ekacco puggalo nevattantapo hoti nāttaparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto na parantapo na paraparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto; so anattantapo aparantapo diṭṭheva dhamme nicchāto nibbuto sītībhūto sukhappaṭisaṃvedī brahmabhūtena attanā viharati.

106. “Katamo ca, gahapatayo, puggalo attantapo attaparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto? Idha, gahapatayo, ekacco puggalo acelako hoti muttācāro hatthāpalekhano ...pe... , iti evarūpaṃ anekavhiṭaṃ kāyassa ātāpanaparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto viharati. Ayaṃ vuccati, gahapatayo, puggalo attantapo attaparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto.

“Katamo (2.0075) ca, gahapatayo, puggalo parantapo paraparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto? Idha, gahapatayo, ekacco puggalo orabbhiko hoti sūkariko ...pe... ye vā panaññepi keci kurūrakammantā. Ayaṃ vuccati, gahapatayo, puggalo parantapo paraparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto.

“Katamo ca, gahapatayo, puggalo attantapo ca attaparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto parantapo ca paraparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto? Idha, gahapatayo, ekacco puggalo rājā vā hoti khattiyo muddhāvasitto ...pe... tepi daṇḍatajjitā bhayatajjitā assumukhā rudamānā parikammāni karonti. Ayaṃ vuccati, gahapatayo, puggalo attantapo ca attaparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto parantapo ca paraparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto.

“Katamo ca, gahapatayo, puggalo nevattantapo nāttaparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto na parantapo na paraparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto; so anattantapo aparantapo diṭṭheva dhamme nicchāto nibbuto sītībhūto sukhappaṭisaṃvedī brahmabhūtena attanā viharati? Idha, gahapatayo, tathāgato loke uppajjati arahaṃ sammāsambuddho ...pe... so ime pañca nīvaraṇe pahāya cetaso upakkilese paññāya dubbalīkaraṇe vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. Vitakkavicārānaṃ vūpasamā ajjhataṃ sampasādanaṃ cetaso ekodibhāvaṃ avitakkaṃ avicāraṃ samādhijaṃ pītisukhaṃ dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ ...pe... tatiyaṃ jhānaṃ... catutthaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati.

“So evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe vigaṭūpakkilese mudubhūte kammaniye ṭhite āneñjappatte pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇāya cittaṃ abhininnāmeti. So anekavhiṭaṃ pubbenivāsaṃ anussarati seyyathidaṃ— ekampi jātiṃ dvepi jātiyo ...pe... iti sākāraṃ sa-uddesaṃ anekavhiṭaṃ pubbenivāsaṃ anussarati. So evaṃ samāhite citte parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe vigaṭūpakkilese mudubhūte kammaniye ṭhite āneñjappatte sattānaṃ cutūpapātañāṇāya cittaṃ abhininnāmeti. So dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamānusakena satte passati cavamāne upapajjamāne hīne paṇṭe suvaṇṇe dubbaṇṇe, sugate duggate ...pe... yathākammūpage satte pajānāti. So evaṃ samāhite (2.0076) citte

parisuddhe pariyodāte anaṅgaṇe vigatūpakkilese mudubhūte kammaniye ṭhite āneñjappatte āsavānaṃ khayañāṇāya cittaṃ abhininnāmeti. So ‘idaṃ dun’ti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti ...pe... ‘ayaṃ āsavanirodhagāminī paṭipadā’ti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti. Tassa evaṃ jānato evaṃ passato kāmāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati, bhavāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati, avijjāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati. Vimuttasmiṃ vimuttamiti ñāṇaṃ hoti. ‘Khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāyā’ti pajānāti. Ayaṃ vuccati, gahapatayo, puggalo nevattantapo nāttaparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto na parantapo na paraparitāpanānuyogamanuyutto; so anattantapo aparantapo diṭṭheva dhamme nicchāto nibbuto sītībhūto sukhappaṭisaṃvedī brahmabhūtena attanā viharatī’ti.

Evaṃ vutte, sāleyyakā brāhmaṇagahapatikā bhagavantaṃ etadvocum— “abhikkantaṃ, bho gotama, abhikkantaṃ, bho gotama! Seyyathāpi, bho gotama, nikkujjitaṃ vā ukkujjeyya, paṭicchannaṃ vā vivareyya, mūḷhasa vā maggaṃ ācikkheyya, andhakāre vā telapajjotaṃ dhāreyya ‘cakkhumanto rūpāni dakkhantī’ti; evamevaṃ bhotā gotamena anekapariyāyena dhammo pakāsito. Ete mayaṃ bhavantaṃ gotamaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāma dhammaṃca bhikkhusaṅghaṃca. Upāsake no bhavaṃ gotamo dhāretu ajjatagge pāṇupetaṃ saraṇaṃ gate”ti.

Apaṇṇakasuttaṃ niṭṭhitaṃ dasamaṃ.

Gahapativaggo niṭṭhito paṭhamaṃ.